the execution of the EIO should be refused.”71 Furthermore, Article 11 (1)(f) of the Directive permits a refusal to execute an EIO on human rights grounds. In striking contrast to the EIO Directive, the Framework Decisions on detention and the FD EAW, contain rather vague references to human rights giving rise to ambiguities. As regards the FD EAW in particular, it was pointed out that the EU legislator chose not to include a specific human rights ground, as Member States can cooperate on the basis of a high level of mutual trust rooted in the presumption that fundamental rights are in principle fully respected at EU level.72 This absence of a fundamental rights based refusal ground in the text of the FD EAW was at the same time criticised as giving “rise to the suspicion that Member States have not given serious consideration to the possibility of grave human rights abuses occurring in other Member States that would give rise to an obligation to refuse surrender.”73 The rationale for the omission was considered at the outset of the final conference held in connection with this Study. It was noted that the EAW is based on an assumption of fundamental rights compliance, secondly, at EU level there are specific measures established to approximate the rights of accused and suspected persons, and finally the suggestion pertaining to sovereignty, that Member States are not competent to assess the system of another Member State.74 While it does not contain an explicit fundamental rights refusal ground, the FD EAW makes three important references to fundamental rights in the text. First, recitals 12 and 13 of the preamble state respectively that the FD “respects fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised by Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union and reflected in the Charter and that “[n]o person should be removed, expelled or extradited to a State where there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment.” Furthermore, the overriding importance of fundamental rights is illustrated in Article 1(3) of the FD, which states that “[t]his Framework Decision shall not have the effect of modifying the obligation to respect fundamental rights and the fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union.” However, some authors have stated that these references do not seem sufficient, either because Member States occasionally violate the ECHR (or the Charter) or because the EAW system itself leads to a lack of certainty or sufficient protection against a violation of a defendant’s procedural rights.75 This is why many commentators argue that a clear refusal ground should be included, as is contained in the EIO Directive.76 71 Emphasis added. 72 Valsamis Mitsilegas, ‘The Symbiotic Relationship Between Mutual Trust and Fundamental Rights in Europe’s Area of Criminal Justice’, New Journal of European Criminal Law (2015) Vol. 6 (4), p.466 [hereinafter: Mitsilegas (2015)]. 73 Susie Alegre and Marisa Leaf, ‘Mutual Recognition in European Judicial Cooperation: A Step Too Far Too Soon? Case Study – The European Arrest Warrant’, European Law Journal (2004) Vol. 10 (2), p.203. 74 Opening Session of Final Conference. Presentation of Wolfgang Bogensberger 16 November 2016. 75 Andrew Sanger, ‘Force of Circumstance: The European Arrest Warrant and Human Rights’, Democracy and Security (2010) Vol. 6 (1) p.27 [hereinafter: Sanger (2010)]. 76 Peers referencing the explicit fundamental rights ground contained in the EIO Directive and the mere reference in the other Framework Decisions on detention demonstrate the view of the EU legislature that there ‘ought to be a genuine human rights exception from mutual recognition obligations.’ Peers EU Justice and Home Affairs Law, EU Law Library, 2016 at page 101; Gert Vermeulen et. al., ‘The Disqualification Triad, Approximating legislation Executing Requests Ensuring Equivalence’ in IRCP Series (2012) Vol. 45, p.100 [hereinafter: Vermeulen (2012)]. 26