CCPR/C/114/D/2017/2010 a request for interim measures of protection had been duly addressed to the State party and that it was subsequently reiterated. 6.4 The Committee reiterates that, apart from any violation of the Covenant found against a State party in a communication, a State party commits serious breaches of its obligations under the Optional Protocol if it acts to prevent or frustrate consideration by the Committee of a communication alleging a violation of the Covenant, or to render examination by the Committee moot and the expression of its Views concerning the implementation of the obligations of the State party under the Covenant nugatory and futile.5 In the present case, the author alleges that his rights under various provisions of the Covenant have been violated in a manner that directly reflects on the legality of his death sentence. Having been notified of the communication and the request by the Committee for interim measures of protection, the State party committed a serious breach of its obligations under the Optional Protocol by executing the alleged victim before the Committee had concluded its consideration of the communication. 6.5 The Committee further recalls that interim measures under rule 92 of its rules of procedure, adopted in accordance with article 39 of the Covenant, are essential to its role under the Optional Protocol, in order to avoid irreparable damage to the victim of the alleged violation. Flouting of that rule, especially by irreversible measures, such as in the present case the execution of Mr. Burdyko, undermines the protection of Covenant rights through the Optional Protocol.6 Consideration of admissibility 7.1 Before considering any claims contained in a communication, the Human Rights Committee must, in accordance with rule 93 of its rules of procedure, decide whether or not it is admissible under the Optional Protocol to the Covenant. 7.2 The Committee has ascertained, as required under article 5 (2) (a), of the Optional Protocol, that the same matter is not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement. 7.3 The Committee notes that the State party has challenged the admissibility of the communication, arguing that the author has not applied for the supervisory review to the Prosecutor’s Office. The Committee recalls its jurisprudence, according to which a petition for supervisory review to a prosecutor’s office, allowing to review court decisions that have taken effect, does not constitute a remedy that has to be exhausted for the purposes of article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol.7 Accordingly, it considers that it is not precluded by article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol from examining this part of the communication. 7.4 The Committee further takes note of the argument of the State party that the communication is inadmissible since it was submitted to the Committee by a third party and not by the alleged victim himself. In that respect, the Committee recalls that rule 96 (b) of its rules of procedure states that a communication should normally be submitted by the individual personally or by a representative of that individual. In the present case, the 5 6 7 See, inter alia, communications No. 1276/2004, Idieva v. Tajikistan, Views adopted on 31 March 2009, para. 7.3; and No. 2120/2011, Kovaleva and Kozyar v. Belarus, Views adopted on 29 October 2012, para. 9.4. See, inter alia, communications No. 964/2001, Saidova v. Tajikistan, Views adopted on 8 July 2004, para. 4.4; No. 1280/2004, Tolipkhuzhaev v. Uzbekistan, Views adopted on 22 July 2009, para. 6.4; and Kovaleva and Kozyar v. Belarus, para. 9.5. See communication No. 1873/2009, Alekseev v. the Russian Federation, Views adopted on 25 October 2013, at para. 8.4. 7