CCPR/C/119/D/2593/2015 6.5 The Committee notes the State party’s argument that the author is seeking to apply articles 17 and 26 of the Covenant in an extraterritorial manner. It notes, however, that the author has clarified that her claims before the Committee are based primarily on article 7 and that the risk to her rights under articles 17 and 26 underscore the increased risk that she would be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment if she were returned to Malaysia. The Committee therefore considers that the author’s allegations under articles 17 and 26 cannot be dissociated from the allegations under article 7, which must be determined on the merits. 6.6 The Committee notes the State party’s argument that the author’s claims under article 7 of the Covenant are insufficiently substantiated. The Committee notes, however, that as a transgender individual the author is part of a particularly vulnerable group in Malaysia, that she claims to have been repeatedly detained and subjected to sexual abuse as a result of her appearance and gender identity, which do not correspond with her identity document and are contrary to sharia law, and that she has argued that her return to Malaysia would expose her to a risk of further police harassment and abuse. The Committee therefore considers that the author has sufficiently substantiated, for the purposes of admissibility, her claims under article 7, read in conjunction with articles 17 (1) and 26, of the Covenant, based on her gender identity. 6.7 In the light of the above, the Committee declares the communication admissible insofar as it appears to raise issues under article 7, read in conjunction with articles 17 (1) and 26, of the Covenant, and proceeds with its consideration of the merits. Consideration of the merits 7.1 The Committee has considered the communication in the light of all the information submitted to it by the parties, in accordance with article 5 (1) of the Optional Protocol. 7.2 The Committee takes note of the author’s claim that, if returned to Malaysia, she would face the risk of being submitted to sexual violence by the Malaysian police based on her gender identity. The author states that her appearance, given her dressing in women’s clothes and following her gender reassignment surgery and hormonal treatment, does not correspond with her identity documents, for which she has been detained on several occasions, submitted to sexual abuse by the Malaysian police and charged with a criminal offence under the sharia law of the State of Melaka, which could entail a fine or imprisonment of up to six months. She alleges that her appearance makes it likely that she will be subjected to continued checks if she is returned to Malaysia given her past experience and the general context of criminalization and persecution of transgender women, as confirmed by international reports submitted by the author, and that her tattoos increase the risk that she will be transferred to the sharia court. She states that, in the context of the case pending against her before the sharia court in Melaka, her gender identity is being made public, in violation of her right to privacy. She further states that, based on her national identity documents, if imprisoned, she would be held together with men, thereby exposing her to further abuse. 7.3 The Committee recalls paragraph 12 of its general comment No. 31 (2004) on the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States parties to the Covenant, in which it refers to their obligation not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove a person from their territory, where there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm, such as that contemplated by article 7 of the Covenant, which prohibits cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The Committee has also indicated that the risk must be personal and that the threshold for providing substantial grounds to establish that a real risk of irreparable harm exists is high. 11 The Committee further recalls its jurisprudence that considerable weight should be given to the assessment conducted by the State party, and that it is generally for the organs of the States parties to the Covenant to review and evaluate facts and evidence in order to determine whether such a risk exists, 12 11 12 6 See, inter alia, communications No. 2007/2010, X v. Denmark, Views adopted on 26 March 2014, para. 9.2; No. 692/1996, A.R.J. v. Australia, Views adopted on 28 July 1997, para. 6.6; and No. 1833/2008, X v. Sweden, Views adopted on 1 November 2011, para. 5.18. See communication No. 1957/2010, Z.H. v. Australia, Views adopted on 21 March 2013, para. 9.3.