“States parties should refrain from deporting individuals to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that they would be in danger of being subjected to torture or other ill-treatment at the hands of non-state entities, including groups that are unlawfully exercising actions that inflict severe pain or suffering for purposes prohibited by the Convention, and over which the receiving State has no or only partial de facto control, or whose acts it is unable to prevent or whose impunity it is unable to counter.” 95. There appears, therefore, to have been a development in the Committee’s interpretation of article 1 in relatively recent times, which may be reflected also in the amendment of Austrian law mentioned earlier. Indeed, the Committee has in recent years been urging a number of states to amend their domestic law so as to conform to its current interpretation of article 1: see, for example, its Concluding Observations on the sixth periodic report on Austria dated 27 January 2016, CAT/C/AUT/CO/6, para 5(a), and its Concluding Observations on the seventh periodic report on the Netherlands dated 18 December 2018, CAT/C/NLD/CO/7, para 7. 96. This development may reflect wider changes. The period since the end of the Cold War has witnessed a proliferation of non-international armed conflict. In that context, the use of torture by non-state actors has become an increasingly serious problem. Against that background, to the extent that the Committee’s current approach to the interpretation of UNCAT departs from the meaning which might have been envisaged in 1984, that development might perhaps be argued to be an example of evolutionary interpretation. 97. That there has been a development must however be borne in mind when considering the relevance of the Committee’s interpretation to the present proceedings, which are concerned with events alleged to have occurred during 1990. An interpretation of UNCAT which was only adopted by the Commission in relatively recent times, long after the events in question, cannot be applied when assessing the criminality of those events, bearing in mind the fundamental principle, recognised in both international and domestic law, of nulla poena sine lege. That principle must be respected in relation to section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, having regard to the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Convention right arising under article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Accordingly, even if article 1 of UNCAT might now be interpreted, consistently with the Committee’s recent statements, as extending to the actions of non-state entities exercising quasi-governmental functions over which the state has no control, it does not follow that it should be interpreted in the same way when considering the criminality of actions which took place in 1990. Page 48