in Honour of William Schabas (2018), p 290; and, perhaps most emphatically, in O’Keefe, International Criminal Law (2015), Part Two, para 7.121. 90. Fourthly, it is apparent that while many states parties, including the United Kingdom, have followed the wording of article 1 when implementing UNCAT in their domestic law, there are also states which have adopted a definition based on the understanding that article 1 is confined to situations where the responsibility of state authorities is engaged. Examples include Norway (where section 174 of the Penal Code of 2005 imposes liability on “any public official”, defined as “any person in central or local government service, or engaged by central or local government to perform a service or work”), Spain (where article 174(1) of the Criminal Code provides that “torture is committed by the public authority or officer who, abusing his office …”). Turkey (where article 94(1) of the Criminal Code imposes liability on “any civil servant …”; article 94(4) imposes an ancillary liability on “any other person found to have participated in this offence”, who “shall be subject to the same punishment as the civil servant”). The implication of the respondent’s argument is that those states parties have failed to implement UNCAT correctly. Counsel for the respondent emphasised that Austria, whose representatives had proposed the wording adopted in article 1, provides in the relevant provision of its Criminal Code (section 312a) that “public officials within the meaning of this provision shall also be those who, in the event of the absence or default of the public authorities, are effectively acting as officials”. What is of greater interest, however, is that this provision was only introduced in 2013. Is it to be inferred that, until then, Austria had failed to implement correctly a provision of UNCAT which had been adopted at its own suggestion? 91. Fifthly, an interpretation of article 1 which confined it to situations where the conduct was the responsibility of the state was consistently adopted by the United Nations Committee Against Torture in its decisions prior to about 2003. In GRB v Sweden, Communication No 83/1997, 15 May 1998, para 6.5, the Committee stated: “The Committee considers that the issue whether the State party has an obligation to refrain from expelling a person who might risk pain or suffering inflicted by a non-governmental entity, without the consent or acquiescence of the Government, falls outside the scope of article 3 of the Convention.” The Committee went somewhat further in Elmi v Australia, Communication No 120/98, 14 May 1999, para 6.5, but in circumstances where there was no functioning state: Page 44