CCPR/C/112/D/2046/2011 3.5 The author also invokes article 2, paragraph 3, of the Covenant, read alone and in conjunction with articles 7, 9, 10, paragraph 1, 17 and 23, paragraph 1. Owing to the conditions of his detention and the fact that he was in isolation for one month, Saleh Salem Hmeed was prevented from challenging the lawfulness of his detention. He was also prevented from exercising his legitimate right to appeal the first-instance ruling and to contest his conviction. All his family’s efforts were in vain. No in-depth investigation was conducted, no proceedings were brought and no reparation was awarded for any of the violations. The author and her family were thus denied an accessible, effective and enforceable remedy. Lack of cooperation from the State party 4. On 13 April 2011, 30 April 2012, 15 March 2013 and 18 September 2013, the State party was invited to submit its comments on the admissibility and merits of the communication. The Committee notes that this information has not been received. It finds it regrettable that the State party has failed to provide any information with regard to the admissibility or substance of the author’s claims. It recalls that, under article 4, paragraph 2, of the Optional Protocol, the State party concerned is required to submit to the Committee written explanations or statements clarifying the matter and describing any measures it may have taken to remedy the situation. In the absence of a reply from the State party, due weight must be given to the author’s allegations, to the extent that these have been properly substantiated.6 Issues and proceedings before the Committee Consideration of admissibility 5.1 Before considering any claim contained in a communication, the Human Rights Committee must decide, in accordance with rule 93 of its rules of procedure, whether the communication is admissible under the Optional Protocol to the Covenant. 5.2 As required under article 5, paragraph 2 (a), of the Optional Protocol, the Committee has ascertained that the same matter is not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement. 5.3 With regard to the exhaustion of domestic remedies, the Committee reiterates its concern that, in spite of three reminders having been addressed to the State party, no information or observations on the admissibility or merits of the communication have been received. The Committee finds that it is not precluded from considering the communication under article 5, paragraph 2 (b), of the Optional Protocol. 5.4 The Committee notes that the part of the communication regarding the arrest, illtreatment, trial and conviction of Saleh Salem Hmeed relates to events that occurred prior to the entry into force of the Optional Protocol for Libya, on 16 May 1989. The Committee refers to its jurisprudence and reiterates that it cannot consider alleged violations of the Covenant that occurred before the entry into force of the Optional Protocol for the State party, unless these violations continue after that date or continue to have effects which in themselves constitute a violation of the Covenant. 7 The Committee observes that the author’s claims under article 7, in relation to the acts of torture against Saleh Salem Hmeed, 6 7 GE.14-22374 See, for example, communications Nos. 1422/2005, El Hassy v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Views adopted on 24 October 2007, para. 4; 1295/2004, El Alwani v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Views adopted on 11 July 2007, para. 4; 1208/2003, Kurbonov v. Tajikistan, Views adopted on 16 March 2006, para. 4; and 760/1997, Diergaardt et al. v. Namibia, Views adopted on 25 July 2000, para. 10.2. See communications Nos. 520/1992, E. and A.K. v. Hungary, decision on admissibility of 7 April 1994, para. 6.4; and 24/1977, Lovelace v. Canada, Views adopted on 30 July 1981, para. 7.3. 7