CAT/C/35/D/238/2003 Page 7 admissible simply because legal aid was subsequently sought, as other reasons of inadmissibility may still apply. In particular, the State party submitted that judicial review was still an “available” remedy to be exhausted. There was no basis for exempting applicants from the obligation to exhaust domestic remedies for lack of financial means, as such an approach had no basis in the text of article 22, paragraph 5, of the Convention. The State party argued that, in any legal system, civil proceedings are generally financed by the parties, and that the framers of the Convention, aware of this approach, made no exception for applicants without resources. Such an approach would interfere with the principle of exhaustion of domestic remedies. 6.3 In the State party’s view, were the Committee to do so, States would either (i) have to provide legal aid to a much greater extent than is currently practiced or required under international conventions, or (ii) accept the Committee’s competence to review administrative decisions rejecting asylum claims without the domestic courts having had the opportunity to review those cases. As to the former option, few States would accept such an approach: civil legal aid is a scarce resource anywhere, and is subject to strict conditions (if available at all). Thus, in view of the large number of asylum applications rejected yearly, a State party would have to take the unlikely step of greatly increasing resources supplied to legal aid schemes. 6.4 The result of such a step would be that the Committee de facto makes itself the first review instance in a vast number of cases, and result in significant growth in the Committee’s caseload. In Norway alone, 9000 asylum applications were rejected at last instance in 2002, and most asylum seekers would claim, as did the current complainant, to be of modest means and unable to access the legal system. There could thus be major consequences for the Committee. 6.5 Administering such an exception would create great difficulties of law and fact for the Committee. It would have to set precise criteria concerning financial ability, and presumably some economic standards that could not be exceeded by applicants claiming impecuniosity. The Committee would have to develop methods to ensure that an applicant does not actually exceed these standards. It would be difficult for States parties to rebut an applicant’s allegation of lack of resources, as pertinent information is rarely available. Likewise, in the present case, the State party had ascertained, through tax records, that the complainant had only very modest incomes in the last few years, and it could not scrutinise his financial situation any further. It had no knowledge of any assets abroad, nor any possessions in Norway which could be realised to finance review proceedings. 6.6 In the State party’s view, only detailed regulations established in advance could deal with such problems, which would merely underpin the absence of such an exception in the Convention. A decision of admissibility would be a significant innovation in the Committee’s case law and a considerable departure from the domestic remedies rule interpreted by treaty bodies. Only the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee revealed some very limited exceptions. The complainant’s comments on the State party’s submissions 7.1 By letter of 26 May 2003, the complainant rejected the State party’s submissions. He stated that he only receives a welfare check for basic daily needs, in addition to housing support, which would not suffice for raising private counsel. His