CAT/C/60/D/653/2015 9.3 The Committee must evaluate whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the complainants would be personally in danger of being subjected to torture upon return to the Russian Federation. In assessing that risk, the Committee must take into account all relevant considerations, pursuant to article 3 (2) of the Convention, including the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. However, the Committee recalls that the aim of such determination is to establish whether the individuals concerned would be personally at a foreseeable and real risk of being subjected to torture in the country to which he or she would be returned. Additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk.16 9.4 The Committee recalls its general comment No. 1, according to which the risk of torture must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory or suspicion. While the risk does not have to meet the test of being highly probable, it must be foreseeable, real and personal. The Committee recalls that, under the terms of general comment No. 1, considerable weight must be given to the findings of fact that are made by organs of the State party concerned, while at the same time it is not bound by such findings and instead has the power, provided by article 22 (4) of the Convention, to freely assess the facts based upon the full set of circumstances in every case. 9.5 In the present case, A.M.D. claimed that, because he was providing assistance to his brother, a rebel in Chechnya, in the night between 29 and 30 June 2013, he had been detained for nine days, interrogated and tortured while in detention. He alleged having been starved, beaten with objects such as plastic bottles filled with water and subjected to electric shocks. He also received threats that he and his family would be killed and his teenage daughter would be raped. A.M.D. also submitted that, should he be returned to the Russian Federation, he would be rearrested and face torture because of his perceived affiliation with the Chechen resistance. The Committee notes that the State party dismissed A.M.D.’s account of torture in Chechnya, stating that his entire account lacked credibility because the complainants had failed to state, on their own initiative, that international passports had been issued to them in April 2013 and that they had aeroplane tickets to take them from Moscow to Barcelona on 20 July 2013. The Committee also notes the State party’s submission that its immigration authorities had found, based on an overall assessment of the information on file, including the report made by the Amnesty International Danish Medical Group on 27 March 2015, that the complainants had not rendered probable the grounds on which their applications for asylum were based, which included the claim that A.M.D. had been detained and subjected to torture and other physical abuse by persons supporting the Chechen authorities shortly before the complainants’ departure in July 2013. 9.6 The Committee notes that A.M.D. provided a detailed description of the torture he had endured, both to the national authorities and in his submission to the Committee. The Committee takes note of the submission by the State party that the consistency between A.M.D.’s description of torture, his physical and psychological symptoms and the findings set out in the report of the Amnesty International Danish Medical Group did not mean that he had been subjected to the alleged physical or mental abuse. The Committee observes, however, that the medical certificate dated 27 March 2015 stated that A.M.D. suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder and probably had been subjected to torture in the past. The Committee also observes that the Refugee Appeals Board refused to reopen the complainant’s asylum case even when faced with that evidence. The Committee considers that the State party, in the light of those doubts, could have reopened the proceedings and ordered an additional examination of the complainant in order to reach a fully informed conclusion on the matter.17 16 17 See communications No. 282/2005, S.P.A. v. Canada, decision adopted on 7 November 2006; No. 333/2007, T.I. v. Canada, decision adopted on 15 November 2010; and No. 344/2008, A.M.A. v. Switzerland, decision adopted on 12 November 2010. See communications No. 481/2011, K.N., F.W. and S.N. v. Switzerland, decision adopted on 19 May 2014; and Nos. 483/2011 and 485/2011, Mr. X and Mr. Z v. Finland, decision adopted on 12 May 2014, para. 7.5. 11