CCPR/C/130/D/2780/2016 availed themselves of. The State party notes that the Draguignan court, in its judgment of 20 June 2014, ordered the authors to pay the Compagnie de financement foncier €1,500 for vexatious litigation. 5.12 The State party considers the allegation of a violation of the right to the enforcement of the Court of Cassation’s judgment of 21 September 2000, and thus of articles 2 (3) and 14 of the Covenant, unfounded for the same reasons as those previously put forward in relation to the Office of the Mortgage Registrar’s refusal to record the judgment of the Court of Cassation. As for the alleged violation of the authors’ right to full compensation for damages caused by the violation of articles 14 and 17 of the Covenant, the State party submits that these grievances cannot form the basis for any claims for monetary compensation, as they are unfounded. In addition, the claims concerning the alleged damages have not been made before the domestic courts and there is no causal link between the damages and these grievances. The authors report not only legal fees relating to the two foreclosure proceedings but also to the rent not paid by their tenants, to the amount they paid to find other housing and to the loss of income from the sale of their property and the sums paid to their creditors. The amounts the authors paid do not concern the two foreclosure proceedings alone, which are the only two proceedings at issue in this communication. The alleged irregularity of the foreclosure proceedings could therefore not justify an award of compensation by the domestic courts. 5.13 With regard to the alleged violation of article 7 of the Covenant, the State party notes that the authors repeat claims that they have already made and that do not suggest that they were subjected to any treatment that could be described as inhuman or degrading. 5.14 No evidence is provided for the authors’ allegations of an attack on their honour and reputation or the judge’s lack of impartiality. Similarly, they provide no specific information on the harassment to which they were allegedly subjected by bailiffs. The State party noted, in addition, that the Office of the Mortgage Registrar’s refusal was fully justified. The length of the proceedings is explained by the possibilities of appeal that, in accordance with the Covenant, the authors availed themselves of. The costs of the proceedings cannot constitute inhuman or degrading treatment. The alleged loss of their home is, for its part, nothing other than the outcome of foreclosure proceedings conducted in accordance with the Covenant. 5.15 The State party requests that this communication be declared inadmissible or dismissed as unfounded. M.F.’s comments on the State party’s observations on admissibility 6.1 In her comments of 21 January 2017, M.F. submits that the communication is admissible rationae materiae and that she and her late husband, who died on 17 July 2015, have exhausted all remedies within the meaning of article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol. 6.2 The underlying presence of a right to property is not an obstacle to admissibility rationae materiae as long as the rights whose violation is alleged are protected under the Covenant. That the right to property is not enshrined in the Covenant does not mean that the author of a communication should refrain from invoking an article of the Covenant simply because invoking it could be seen as akin to invoking a right to property. 28 6.3 The author submits that the repossessed house was indeed their home within the meaning of article 17 of the Covenant and that the State party cannot take the view that a home that is no longer occupied because of wrongful action by the State party should no longer be protected under the Covenant. Had it not been for all these legal proceedings, which were very costly, and had their house not been sold at auction, the authors would never have stopped living in it. The house has always been their home, except when they rented it out in an attempt to ensure that the courts would allow them to keep it. The authors moved into the house in August 1990, rented it out in 1996 and returned to it in 1997. They rented it out again in June 1998. In June 2008, the authors moved back in and stayed until they were forced out in 2013. There is no reason to consider the authors’ house their home for the period from 1998 to 2013 alone, as the State party does. On 14 June 1990, when the Draguignan court 28 GE.21-01892 Simunek et al. v. Czech Republic, paras. 11.3 and 12.1, and Czernin v. Czech Republic, para. 6.7. 9