CCPR/C/123/D/2423/2014 author mentioned nothing about Z.A. or any interest in Christianity at the asylum screening interview conducted by the Immigration Service on 3 January 2013. On the contrary, he stated that he was a Muslim. The State party considers that this is inconsistent with the author’s own statements to the Immigration Service on 19 November 2013 that his conversation with Z.A. had affected him so deeply that he had felt like a Christian immediately thereafter. Moreover, the fact that the author requested letters of support for his asylum claim from pastors immediately before the hearing at the Refugee Appeals Board and the interview at the Immigration Service supports the view that he was very aware of the significance that this information might have for his asylum case, and that his conversion did not convey a genuine and deep conviction. 4.14 Therefore, the State party agrees with the Danish Refugee Appeals Board that the author’s conversion to Christianity is not genuine and is not the result of a natural development within the author himself. The State party refers to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, which considers that “the national authorities are best placed to assess not just the facts but, more particularly, the credibility of witnesses since it is they who have had an opportunity to see, hear and assess the demeanour of the individual concerned”.11 The State party also refers to a specific case against Denmark, where the Court observed that in the proceedings before the Danish Immigration Service and the Refugee Appeals Board, “the applicant was represented by a lawyer and he was given the opportunity to submit written observations and documents. His arguments were duly considered and the authorities’ assessment in this regard must be considered adequate and sufficiently supported by domestic materials as well as by materials originating from other reliable and objective sources.”12 The State party further refers to the Committee’s findings in a communication concerning Denmark, in which the Committee stated that “the authors’ refugee claims were thoroughly assessed by the State party’s authorities, which found that the authors’ declarations about the motive for seeking asylum and their account of the events that caused their fear of torture or killing were not credible” and also observed “that the authors have not identified any irregularity in the decision-making process, or any risk factor that the State party’s authorities failed to take properly into account”.13 4.15 The State party also draws the Committee’s attention to the fact that public debate in Denmark in general and among asylum seekers in particular has focused considerably on the significance of conversion, typically from Islam to Christianity, to the outcome of an asylum case. It is therefore common knowledge among asylum seekers and other parties within the field of asylum that information on conversion is a ground for asylum, but the issue must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. The State party therefore submits that, in the present case, the return of the author to the Islamic Republic of Iran will not constitute a violation of articles 6 or 7 of the Covenant. 4.16 Regarding the author’s allegation that the absence of access to judicial review of the decisions made by the Danish Refugee Appeals Board constitutes a violation of articles 2, 13 and 26 of the Covenant, the State party observes that article 13 does not confer a right to a court hearing. Thus, in Maroufidou v. Sweden, the Committee did not dispute that a mere administrative “review” of the expulsion order in question was compatible with article 13. 14 Also, in Mr. X and Ms. X v. Denmark, the Committee stated that article 13 did not confer a right to appeal. 15 The State party also recalls that the author’s asylum application was examined by two instances — the Danish Immigration Service and the Danish Refugee Appeals Board. 4.17 Finally, as regards articles 2 and 26 of the Covenant, the State party generally observes that the author has been treated no differently from any other person applying for asylum, in terms of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national 11 12 13 14 15 See European Court of Human Rights, R.C. v. Sweden (application No. 41827/07), judgment of 9 March 2010, para. 52. See European Court of Human Rights, M.E. v. Denmark (application No. 58363/10), 8 July 2014, para. 63. See Mr. X and Ms. X v. Denmark, para. 7.5. See Maroufidou v. Sweden (CCPR/C/12/D/58/1979). See Mr. X and Ms. X v. Denmark, para. 6.3. 7