01005714 Case File No. 002/19-09-2007/ECCC/TC E313 Party lines and the Party Statute.229 There is no surviving documentation from the meeting, possibly because nothing was prepared other than the Party Statute itself.230 88. According to NUON Chea, the First Congress decided to use arms only if necessary to protect their forces.231 Throughout the period of Democratic Kampuchea (“DK era”),232 however, the CPK leaders, including NUON Chea, IENG Sary and POL Pot stated on many occasions that the First Congress in 1960 adopted “revolutionary violence” and decided to use “armed struggle” to achieve its goals.233 The use of “revolutionary violence” had been the subject of disagreement between Khmer Rouge leaders and Vietnamese communists from the signing of the Geneva Agreement throughout the 1960s. In January and May 1959 for example, the Vietnamese Workers’ Party agreed to change from political to armed struggle against the Republic of South Vietnam, but they opposed the Cambodian communists adopting the same strategy.234 229 Article by NUON C.: Past Struggle of Our Kampuchean Peasants From 1954 to 1970, E3/131, , p. 12, ERN (En) 00716420; Revolutionary Flag, E3/11, September 1977, p. 15, ERN (En) 00486226; Pol Pot’s Press Conference in Peking (in SWB Collection), E3/2072, 3 October 1977, ERN (En) S 00080547. 230 Book by KHIEU S.: Considerations on the History of Cambodia From the Early Stage to the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, E3/16, p. 12, ERN (En) 00498231. 231 T. 22 November 2011 (NUON Chea), p. 83; T. 11 January 2012 (NUON Chea), pp. 32-33, 38-40. 232 See ECCC Agreement (defining the period of Democratic Kampuchea from 1975-1979 and establishing temporal jurisdiction from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979); See also, ECCC Law, Articles 1-8. 233 Nuon Chea Speaks on Cambodian Army Anniversary (in FBIS Collection), E3/147, 17 January 1977, ERN (En) 00168467 (“Since 1960, our Cambodian Revolutionary Organization had drawn up the strategic and tactical lines for revolution in a democratic nation […] after 1960 our Revolutionary Organization clearly decided that political action and armed violence must be used to overthrow and crush the enemy.”); Revolutionary Flag, E3/25, December 1976-January 1977, p. 19, ERN (En) 00491412 (“revolutionary political and armed violence” and “armed violence”), p. 24, ERN (En) 00491417 (“beginning in 1960 […] the Party had a strategic line and a tactical line including making ready for revolutionary violence and setting up an army”); Book by KHIEU S.: Considerations on the History of Cambodia From the Early Stage to the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, E3/16, p. 12, ERN (En) 00498231 (“‘exploiting classes’” were the primary enemy of the Cambodian revolution and ‘the tools of the American imperialists.’ Thus, the Cambodian people had to smash the ‘feudalist regime’ whether by peaceful methods or by other means.”); Article by D. BURSTEIN: Interview with Deputy Prime Minister Ieng Sary, in Kampuchea Today: An Eyewitness Report From Cambodia, E3/707, December 1978, p. 42, ERN (En) S 00049323 (“armed struggle”); Pol Pot’s Press Conference in Peking (in SWB Collection), E3/2072, 3 October 1977, ERN (En) S 00080547 (“We attached special importance to violent struggle, unfolding both violent political struggle and armed struggle with armed struggle as the main form.”) 234 Book by E. BECKER: When the War was Over: Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge Revolution, E3/20, p. 89, ERN (En) 00237794; See also, Book by KHIEU S.: Considerations on the History of Cambodia From the Early Stage to the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, E3/16, pp. 11-12, ERN (En) 00498230-31 (According to KHIEU Samphan in a letter to the Cambodian Party leadership in late 1959, the Vietnamese Workers’ Party noted its support of the Sihanouk regime and encouraged the Case 002/01, Judgement, 7 August 2014 - Public 47