CEDAW/C/75/D/108/2016 elements pertaining to the author’s credibility and that the author has not disputed the credibility assessment. 4.8 On the credibility assessment, the State party refers to the Comm ittee’s decision in M.C. v. Denmark, in which it was noted that, on the basis of the limited information provided by the author, and considering that she had provided no information as to how the harassment of her children would constitute a personal risk to her, the Committee was unable to establish whether there had been systematic harassment amounting to gender-based violence in the author’s case. In addition, the Committee noted that the author had made no link between the alleged facts and the violatio n of the articles of the Convention that she had invoked. In the circumstances, the Committee considered that the author had failed to sufficiently substantiate, for the purposes of admissibility, her claim that her removal would expose her to a real, personal and foreseeable risk of serious forms of gender-based violence. It therefore declared the communication inadmissible. 4 4.9 The State party also refers to the decision of the Human Rights Committee in N. v. Denmark, in which the Committee recalled that it was generally for the organs of States parties to examine the facts and evidence of a case, unless it could be established that such an assessment was arbitrary or amounted to a manifest error or denial of justice. 5 The author had not explained why the decision of the Refugee Appeals Board would be contrary to that standard, nor had he provided substantial grounds to support his claim that his removal would expose him to a real risk of irreparable harm in violation of article 7 of the International Cove nant on Civil and Political Rights. The Committee accordingly concluded that the author had failed to sufficiently substantiate his claim of a violation of article 7 for the purposes of admissibility and found that the communication was inadmissible pursuant to article 2 of the Optional Protocol to the Covenant. 4.10 The State party notes that, in K. v. Denmark, 6 the Human Rights Committee recalled that it was generally for the organs of States parties to examine the facts and evidence of the case in order to determine whether such a risk existed, unless it could be established that the assessment was arbitrary or amounted to a manifest error or denial of justice. In the same case, 7 the Refugee Appeals Board thoroughly examined each of the author’s claims, analysing in particular the threats allegedly received by the author, and found them to be inconsistent and implausible on several grounds. The author challenged the assessment of evidence and the factual conclusions by the Board, but he did not explain why that assessment would be arbitrary or otherwise amount to a denial of justice. 4.11 The State party also notes that the European Court of Human Rights has accepted that, as a general principle, the national authorities are best placed to assess not only the facts but, in particular, the credibility of witnesses, because it was they who had had an opportunity to see, hear and assess the demeanour of the individual concerned. 8 4.12 The State party observes that it cannot accept as fact that the autho r established contact with her spouse and became aware that he had fled Somalia and had been staying in the Sudan and that her father-in-law had been killed by her uncle. The author’s initial account of her grounds for asylum has been dismissed, and the ne w __________________ 4 5 6 7 8 20-05121 M.C. v. Denmark (CEDAW/C/62/D/56/2013), para. 9.4. N. v. Denmark (CCPR/C/114/D/2426/2014), para. 6.6. K. v. Denmark (CCPR/C/114/D/2393/2014), para. 7.4. K. v. Denmark, para. 7.5. European Court of Human Rights, R.C. v. Sweden (application No. 41827/07), judgment of 9 March 2010, para. 52. 5/9