application of a moral principle. That would be to treat a moral principle as giving with one hand and taking away with the other. That makes no sense. Either the police may rely on such information when carrying out their duties, or they may not. If they can properly have regard to such information despite its tainted source, and in the particular case do so, they should not be precluded from referring to this information in court when giving evidence seeking to justify their decisions and actions. Repugnance to the use in court of information procured by torture does not require the police to give an incomplete account of the matters they took into account when making their decisions. (Different considerations apply where, in the interests of national security, there are statutory or other restrictions on the use of certain matters in legal proceedings, such as the contents of intercepted communications or information attracting public interest immunity. In these cases the ‘mismatch’ arises from a perceived need to preserve confidentiality, not from the application of a broad moral principle.) 73. So far I have noted the distinction between executive decisions of an essentially operational or short-term character and judicial decisions on criminal charges. Tainted information may be taken into account in the former case but not the latter. I have also noted that when reviewing the lawfulness of such executive decisions a court may have regard to all the matters the decision-maker properly took into account. 74. But this categorisation by no means covers the whole ground. Many cases do not conform to this simple division of functions. Executive decisions, such as deportation, may have serious long-term consequences for an individual. And judicial supervision of an executive decision may take different forms. The Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 is a recent instance. Certification of a person as a ‘suspected international terrorist’ is the responsibility of the Secretary of State. The issue of this certificate authorises the minister to exercise extensive powers, including power under section 23 to detain the certified person indefinitely in certain circumstances. This power of detention, in its adverse impact on an individual, goes far beyond the adverse impact of executive acts such as search and arrest. Detention by order of the executive under the 2001 Act is not a preliminary step leading to a criminal charge. 75. Despite this difference, in the case of this Act the rationale underlying the distinction between the executive’s ability to take into account information procured by torture and the court’s refusal to admit such evidence holds good. It holds good because the Special -50-