CAT/C/66/D/829/2017 prohibition of torture is absolute and non-derogable and that no exceptional circumstances whatsoever may be invoked by a State party to justify acts of torture. 7 7.3 In assessing whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the alleged victim would be in danger of being subjected to torture, the Committee recalls that, under article 3 (2) of the Convention, States parties must take into account all relevant considerations, including the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in the country to which he or she would be returned. In this case, however, the Committee must determine whether the complainant runs a personal risk of being subjected to torture if he is returned to Benin. The existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute sufficient reason for determining that the complainant would be in danger of being subjected to torture on return to that country; additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk. 8 Conversely, the absence of a consistent pattern of flagrant violations of human rights does not mean that a person might not be subjected to torture in his or her specific circumstances. 9 7.4 The Committee recalls its general comment No. 4 (2017) on the implementation of article 3 of the Convention in the context of article 22, according to which the nonrefoulement obligation exists whenever there are “substantial grounds” for believing that the person concerned would be in danger of being subjected to torture in a State to which he or she is facing deportation, either as an individual or as a member of a group that may be at risk of being tortured in the State of destination. The Committee’s practice in this context has been to determine that “substantial grounds” exist whenever the risk of torture is “foreseeable, personal, present and real”.10 Indications of personal risk may include, but are not limited to, the political affiliation or political activities of the complainant or members of his or her family, or the existence of an arrest warrant without a guarantee of fair treatment and trial. 11 The Committee recalls that the burden of proof is upon the complainant, who must present an arguable case, that is, submit circumstantiated arguments showing that the danger of being subjected to torture is foreseeable, personal, present and real. However, when complainants are in a situation where they cannot elaborate on their case, the burden of proof is reversed and the State party concerned must investigate the allegations and verify the information on which the complaint is based. 12 The Committee also recalls that it gives considerable weight to findings of fact made by organs of the State party concerned; however, it is not bound by such findings and will make a free assessment of the information available to it in accordance with article 22 (4) of the Convention, taking into account all the circumstances relevant to each case. 13 7.5 In the present case, the Committee notes the complainant’s argument that, if he were to be returned to Benin, he would be at risk of being arrested and recognized by the masked persons (soldiers) who tortured and raped him during his detention because of his indirect involvement in the attempted coup attributed to the current President of Benin, and who, according to the complainant, are still on active service. The Committee also notes that the complainant fears he would not have access to appropriate psychiatric care in his country of origin. 7.6 The Committee recalls that it must ascertain whether the complainant currently runs a risk of being subjected to torture if returned to Benin. It notes that the complainant had ample opportunity to provide supporting evidence and more details about his claims, at the national level, to the State Secretariat for Migration and the Federal Administrative Court, but that the evidence provided did not lead the national authorities to conclude that he would be at risk of being subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 GE.19-12653 General comment No. 2 (2007) on the implementation of article 2 by States parties, para. 5. Alhaj Ali v. Morocco (CAT/C/58/D/682/2015), para. 8.3; R.A.Y. v. Morocco (CAT/C/52/D/525/2012), para. 7.2; and L.M. v. Canada (CAT/C/63/D/488/2012), para. 11.3. Kalinichenko v. Morocco (CAT/C/47/D/428/2010), para. 15.3. General comment No. 4, para. 11. Ibid., para. 45. Ibid., para. 38. Ibid., para. 50. 7