CCPR/C/130/D/2818/2016 party’s statement that no articles about him appeared in the media until after the issuance of the decision of the Supreme Court. In fact, the author learned from the media that he was wanted by the police. A media campaign describing the author as a violent offender, a trafficker and an associate of Lithuanian organized crime groups was initiated on 16 October 2009. The statements in the media violated the author’s right to the presumption of innocence. The author maintains that, while an interpreter did tell him, in Lithuanian, that he had been charged with human trafficking, he did not receive a formal notification specifying the accusations and explaining his rights as an accused. 5.8 Although the author was able to appeal the decision against him and was given the right to speak, the State party did not demonstrate that the appeal was an effective review procedure. The author’s appeal and arguments were not analysed by the Supreme Court, which was biased against the author and merely reformulated the reasoning provided by the court of lower instance. Issues and proceedings before the Committee Consideration of admissibility 6.1 Before considering any claim contained in a communication, the Committee must decide, in accordance with rule 97 of its rules of procedure, whether the communication is admissible under the Optional Protocol. 6.2 The Committee notes that, under article 5 (2) (a) of the Optional Protocol and the State party’s reservation to that provision, the Committee is precluded from examining a matter that is being examined or has been examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement. On 28 March 2013, the European Court of Human Rights declared the author’s application inadmissible. 2 The Committee notes, however, that the decision of the Court does not set forth a specific justification for the finding of inadmissibility. It is therefore unclear whether the decision was based on procedural or substantive grounds. Accordingly, the Committee is unable to conclude that the same matter has been examined by the Court.3 Thus, the Committee considers that it is not precluded by article 5 (2) (a) of the Optional Protocol from examining the communication. 6.3 The Committee notes that the State party has not contested the author’s argument that he exhausted all available domestic remedies. It also notes that, when appealing his conviction to the Supreme Court, the author raised multiple issues regarding the fairness of his trial, the length of time in detention and his detention in solitary confinement. The Committee observes that the material before it does not, however, reveal that the author raised in his appeals the substance of his claims under articles 7 or 10 of the Covenant, apart from claims based on the fact of his solitary confinement; or his claims under article 26 regarding the publication of biased articles in the media. Accordingly, the Committee considers that article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol precludes it from examining those claims. The Committee considers that article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol does not preclude it from examining the author’s remaining claims under articles 2, 7, 9, 10, 14 and 26 of the Covenant. 6.4 The Committee notes the State party’s position that the communication is inadmissible because it was not submitted within five years of the date on which the author exhausted domestic remedies. The Committee recalls that, while there are no fixed time limits for the submission of communications under the Optional Protocol, 4 rule 99 (c) of the Committee’s rules of procedure states that a communication may constitute an abuse of the right of submission when it is submitted five years after the exhaustion of domestic remedies by the author of the communication, or, where applicable, three years from the conclusion of 2 3 4 The author provides a letter from the European Court of Human Rights dated 4 April 2013 concerning his application (No. 376/11) against Iceland. In the letter, the Court stated that, on 28 March 2013, it had decided to declare the application inadmissible, sitting in a single-judge formation. Furthermore, the Court stated that, in the light of all the material in its possession and insofar as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court has found that the admissibility criteria set out in articles 34 and 35 of the Convention have not been met. See X v. Norway (CCPR/C/115/D/2474/2014), para. 6.2. Gratzinger and Gratzinger v. Czech Republic (CCPR/C/91/D/1463/2006), para. 6.3. 9