structures are not adequately in place, there will be a capacity problem with respect to the ability of that state to appropriately and effectively give effect to that order or recommendation. The second concern is the lack of will. This is particularly problematic for the treaty bodies, whose ‘views’ or decisions are not understood as binding, although of course the argument can be made that the views and decisions of the treaty bodies are necessarily binding given that they are the authoritative interpretation of the treaty, which the states have agreed to enforce. To a certain extent, this judgment was likely influenced by the LaGrand case, given the timing. Conclusion In summary, with respect to the legal basis for interim measures, we have a variety of different systems. The legal basis will be determined either by treaty, internal rules, or it will be determined by implication, binding on the basis of a good faith interpretation of the relevant treaties. Bodies that issue views or recommendations face distinct challenges in the sense that if the overall mandate of the body is not capable of issuing binding decisions, and therefore it is more difficult to imply a binding nature to an interim measure. This is one of the challenges of UN treaty bodies in trying to cultivate the argument that interim measures are binding. Not to say that the argument cannot be made—certainly it can and it should—but one can understand why it can be difficult, and why certain states have not seen it necessary to enforce interim measures. With respect to the legal basis of interim measures, there are several different types of frameworks. Some courts and bodies have within their treaties the power to order interim measures. So, for instance, the International Court of Justice, or the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights have specific provisions in their founding documents which deal with these matters. Others do not have such provisions in their statutes, but internal regulations have provided their ability to order interim measures. Here we can think of the European Court of Human Rights as an example, which has developed rules, but they are not part of the statute as such. And, other bodies have no provisions either in the statute, or in regulations, however they nonetheless interpret their mandate to allow them to order interim measures. In conclusion, the first way to strengthen protection measures in the context of human rights litigants’ need for protection is to make the system of interim measures as binding as possible. Second, I suggest that it is necessary to clarify what states are obliged to do in order to make protection effective. Given the gaps at the domestic level, it would be helpful for international bodies—including the treaty mechanisms, and in particular the UN Committee against Torture—to explain in great detail what is necessary to protect human rights litigants in the context of the Convention. This is something which has not been done; domestic practice is inadequate, international standards are simply not sufficiently clear. While there must be continued efforts to tackle the lack of will at the domestic level, capacity is something that one has a greater chance of influencing. Making those standards as clear as possible to enable implementation by domestic authorities is important. With respect to how these different frameworks have been understood, the International Court of Justice has come out with an important decision, which Hélène has already mentioned, in the LaGrand case.14 The Court indicated that the failure of the United States to implement the interim measures that were issued by the International Court of Justice constituted a violation of the United States’ obligations. In that particular case, it was quite interesting, because the International Court of Justice in its Statute specifically recognizes interim measures; however, it does not go so far as to indicate that the interim measures contained in the Statute are binding. So, it is mentioned in the Statute; however, there is no mention of whether they are binding or recommendatory. Nonetheless, the International Court of Justice’s decision concluded that because of the important role of interim measures in safeguarding the sanctity of the system, those interim measures had to be regarded as binding. What are the positive measures of protection that human rights bodies can insert into their interim measures? The UN Committee against Torture and other bodies can be more descriptive in the types of measures that they set out in their interim measures findings. And, also it would be helpful to strengthen follow-up mechanisms, both follow-up of interim measures as well as follow-up of decisions where protection features as part of the decision. In addition, it may be useful for the Committee to issue a General Comment on Article 13 of the Convention against Torture. It could be quite interesting and it could potentially have an important role not only in relation to the Convention against Torture but also with respect to the clarification of applicable standards of protection in human rights cases more broadly. There has been progressive development in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. In an early case regarding an expulsion from Sweden to Chile, the European Court indicated that the interim measures were not binding. But that position has changed. In a more recent case regarding an extradition from Turkey to Uzbekistan, the European Court made a very clear finding that interim measures must necessarily be binding. 13