CCPR/C/123/D/2768/2016 Office of Immigration and Nationality transmitting it to the court. She further notes that in the case of her sister, who received a negative decision on the same day and followed the same procedure, an appeal is still pending, as the Budapest Administrative and Labour Court did not take a decision within the eight days allowed and has therefore been able to take counsel’s submission and the supporting documents into account. 3.12 The author has also been deprived of the ability to express her views on expulsion because the court denied her request for a personal hearing. That goes against the Committee’s Views in Ahani v. Canada. In that case, the failure of the State party to provide the author with procedural protection on the basis that he had not demonstrated a risk of harm did not satisfy the obligation in article 13 to allow the author to submit reasons against his removal and to have his submissions reviewed by a competent authority. 29 3.13 As regards the alleged violation of article 2 (3) (a), read together with article 7 of the Covenant, the judicial review of the Budapest Administrative and Labour Court was not an effective remedy. The court did not consider the opinion of various international bodies, including UNHCR, regarding practical deficiencies in the Serbian asylum procedure, but instead relied on the existence of an asylum law to guarantee protection and on the fact that Serbia had ratified relevant conventions. Further, the Office of Immigration and Nationality did not forward counsel’s submission to the court without delay and the court did not have time to consider the submission within the eight-day deadline. The eight-day deadline for the court to deliver a decision is in general insufficient for “a full and ex-nunc examination of both facts and points of law” as prescribed by European Union law. 30 Five or six working days are not enough for a judge to obtain crucial evidence, such as digested and translated country information or a medical/psychological expert opinion, or to arrange a personal hearing with a suitable interpreter. 3.14 The remedy is also ineffective because a personal hearing by the judge is not mandatory.31 That is especially problematic because a hearing is a crucial safeguard in the judicial review procedure, when the first instance judge delivers a final, non-appealable decision. The unreasonably short time limit and the lack of a personal hearing can reduce the judicial review to a mere formality, in which the judge has no other information than the documents in the case file provided by the Office of Immigration and Nationality. Thus, in the light of the potentially irreversible harm that may result — directly or indirectly — from returning an applicant to a third country, the author’s case was not subject to “rigorous scrutiny”, in line with the principle established by the jurisprudence of the European Court.32 By not considering the potential risk for the author of being subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment if returned to Serbia and the risk of further chain refoulement, the judicial review procedure before the Budapest Administrative and Labour Court is in breach of article 2 (3) (a) read in conjunction with article 7 of the Covenant. State party’s observations on admissibility and the merits 4.1 On 21 December 2016, the State party submitted its observations on admissibility and the merits of the communication. It claims that the minutes of the interview with the Office of Immigration and Nationality were signed by the author and, according to the minutes, they were read back to her, as demonstrated by the signatures of both the author and the interpreter. Moreover, during the hearing, the author was specifically asked if she had understood the interpreter and she replied in the affirmative, declaring that she had not faced communication problems. The burden of proof therefore lies with the author to rebut the documentary evidence of the case file in the administrative proceedings. 4.2 Regarding the decision of the Office of Immigration and Nationality of 15 April 2016, the author’s submission concerning the minutes only arrived at the Office after the decision of the authority had already been delivered. The asylum authority was therefore 29 30 31 32 Ahani v. Canada (CCPR/C/80/D/1051/2002), para. 10.8. See article 46 (3) Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (recast). See section 53 (4) of the Asylum Act. See European Court of Human Rights, Chahal v. UK, Case No. 22414/93, Judgment, 15 November 1996. 7