CCPR/C/133/D/2619/2015 Advance unedited version the Committee concludes that the facts as described by the author disclose a violation of article 14 (2) of the Covenant. 7.8 The Committee also recalls its previous jurisprudence that the wording of article 14 (3) (g) of the Covenant, that no one shall be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt, must be understood in terms of the absence of any direct or indirect physical or psychological pressure from the investigating authorities on the accused with a view to obtaining a confession of guilt. 27 The Committee also recalls that, in cases involving allegations of forced confessions, the burden is on the State to prove that statements made by the accused have been given of their own free will.28 In the circumstances, the Committee concludes that the facts before it also disclose a violation of 14 (3) (g) of the Covenant. 7.9 The author also claims a violation of article 17 of the Covenant, arguing that the State party’s authorities unlawfully tapped Mr. Statkevich’s telephone, recording calls made by himself during presidential campaign in 2010 and thereafter published the transcripts. He further argued that the wiretapping was unnecessary, illegal and unjustified, and was therefore a violation of his right to privacy. Furthermore, information obtained illegally through that instance of wiretapping was used by the trial court as evidence to prove the author’s guilt. The Committee notes in that regard that the State party has not commented on the author’s detailed allegations in that regard. The Committee therefore concludes that the facts before it amounts to a violation by the State party of the author’s right under article 17 of the Covenant. 7.10 The Committee notes the author’s claim that Mr. Statkevich’s criminal conviction under article 293, part 1, of the Criminal Code constituted a violation of his rights to hold opinions without interference and to freedom of expression, as guaranteed under article 19 of the Covenant, because the restrictions imposed by the State party on the exercise of those rights were not provided for by law and were not necessary in a democratic society. The author argued that the State party’s authorities prosecuted Mr. Statkevich and sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment for exercising his right to freedom of expression and political activities. The Committee also notes the author’s claim that such a punishment was manifestly disproportionate because the investigating bodies did not show that there was any direct causal link between Mr. Statkevich’s incriminating statements and the unlawful actions of the unidentified individuals who stormed the House of Government on 19 December 2010.29 7.11 The Committee refers to its general comment No. 34 (2011) on the freedoms of opinion and expression, which states that freedom of opinion and freedom of expression are indispensable conditions for the full development of the person, and that such freedoms are essential for any society. They constitute the foundation stone for every free and democratic society30. The Committee recalls that article 19 (3) of the Covenant allows certain restrictions only such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) for the respect of the rights or reputations of others; and (b) for the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals. Any restriction on the exercise of such freedoms must conform to the strict tests of necessity and proportionality. Restrictions must be applied only for those purposes for which they were prescribed and must be directly related to the specific need on which they are predicated.31 The Committee also recalls that it is for the State party to demonstrate that the restrictions on Mr. Statkevich’s rights under article 19 of the Covenant were necessary and proportionate. 32 In the present case, the Committee observes, however, that neither the State party nor the courts have provided any explanation as to how the 27 28 29 30 31 32 10 See Berry v. Jamaica (CCPR/C/50/D/330/1988), para. 11.7; Singarasa v. Sri Lanka (CCPR/C/81/D/1033/2001), para. 7.4; and Deolall v. Guyana (CCPR/C/82/D/912/2000), para. 5.1. See Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 32 (2007) on the right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair trial, para. 41. See, for example, Sannikov v. Belarus (CCPR/C/122/D/2212/2012), para. 6.10. See Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 34 (2011) on the freedoms of opinion and expression, para. 2. Ibid, para. 22. See, for example, Pivonos v. Belarus (CCPR/C/106/D/1830/2008), para. 9.3; and Olechkevitch v. Belarus (CCPR/C/107/D/1785/2008), para. 8.5; and Androsenko v. Belarus (CCPR/C/116/D/2092/2011), para. 7.3.