CAT/C/42/D/324/2007 Page 5 4.3 On 29 April 2005, the AAT concluded that it could not establish that the complainant had committed war crimes or crimes against humanity. It confirmed, however, that he was not entitled to a protection visa as he had committed serious non-political offences outside Australia. 4.4 In the meantime, in April 2005, the Syrian forces withdrew. Also in 2005, Parliamentary elections were held in Lebanon, and in July 2005 a new pro-independence Government, which includes members of the Lebanese Forces, was formed. In August 2005, the Government’s 1994 resolution outlawing the Lebanese Forces was rescinded. 4.5 On 9 November 2005, the complainant asked the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship to exercise his discretion to grant him a visa. On 13 July 2006, the Minister decided that it was not in the public interest to intervene. On 2 May 2007, the complainant requested the Minister to exercise his/her discretion to grant him a visa in light of new information. 4.6 The State party recalls that article 3 enshrines an absolute obligation not to return a person to a State where there are serious grounds to believe that he/she would be in danger of being subjected to torture. 1 It refers to the Committee’s jurisprudence that this obligation must be interpreted by reference to the definition of torture set out in article 1.2 It also recalls that the definition of torture makes it clear that suffering constituting torture must be inflicted by/at the instigation of or with the consent/acquiescence of a public official or a person acting in an official capacity. 4.7 The State party recalls that the obligation of non-refoulement is confined to torture and does not extend to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.3 While the boundary between torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is not always clear, the historical development of the concept shows that torture involves intentional harm and a degree of severity going beyond cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 4.8 The State party recalls that each case must be assessed individually. Whether conduct amounts to torture depends on the nature of the alleged act and must involve a degree of severity beyond cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.4 It is not sufficient that there is a ‘consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights’; ‘additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk’.5 The State party also recalls that the onus of proving that there is ‘a foreseeable, real and personal risk of being subjected to torture’ upon removal rests on the applicant.6 The risk in question need not be ‘highly probable’, but it must be ‘assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory and suspicion’.7 1 Paez v Sweden, Communication No. 39/1996, 28 April 1997, 86, paragraph 14.5. G.R.B. v Sweden, Communication No. 83/1997, 15 May 1998, paragraph 6.5. 3 General Comment No 1, paragraph 1. 4 Vuolanne v Finland, CCPR, Communication No. 265/1987, 7 April 1989, paragraph 9.2; Cruz Varas v Sweden, 20 March 1991, Series A, No 241, 14 EHRR 1, page 37. 5 H.M.H.I v Australia, CAT, Communication No. 177/2001, 1 May 2002, paragraph 6.5. 6 A. R. v The Netherlands, CAT, Communication No. 203/2002, 14 November 2003, paragraph 7.3. 7 Idem. 2