CEDAW/C/76/D/116/2017 challenge a law or practice claimed to be contrary to the Convention. 22 In the present case, the Committee notes that the author presents the legal framework only as background information to help to explain her personal situation and its impact on her claims. Thus, the Committee considers that the communication does not constitute an actio popularis and that the facts as submitted do not preclude the Committee from declaring the communication admissible in that regard. 7.3 The Committee recalls that, under article 4 (1) of the Optional Protocol, it is precluded from considering a communication unless it has ascertained that all available domestic remedies have been exhausted or that the application of such remedies is unreasonably prolonged or unlikely to bring effective relief. 23 The Committee notes the State party’s argument that the author’s case is still under investigation or before national authorities. Nonetheless, the Committee also notes the author’s submission that she has exhausted all available domestic remedies that would have been likely to bring sufficient relief and the application of which would not have been unreasonably prolonged. As conceded by the State party, the author brought the case to the Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2009 and appealed o n 4 June 2014 to the Constitutional Court, which also recognized that “the investigative process had been slow and mostly inconclusive” in its ruling of 17 February 2016. 7.4 The Committee also notes that the author’s additional information submitted on 30 April 2020, indicating that the Constitutional Court rejected the author’s complaint regarding her application for status as a civilian victim of armed conflict under the law. Although the author was granted the status of a victim of conflict -related sexual violence on 8 February 2019 under the law of Republika Srpska, the Committee also notes the author’s assertion that the amount of the pension is not proportionate to the gravity of the crime and the harm that she has suffered and is thus not fully effec tive. 7.5 In the absence of an explanation by the State party as to how the investigation would not be further prolonged or how proceedings under those laws would have been effective in securing the rights of the author, the Committee concludes that the domestic remedies referred to by the State party have been unreasonably prolonged and were unlikely to bring effective relief to the author. Accordingly, the Committee is not precluded, by virtue of the requirements of article 4 (1) of the Optional Protocol, from considering the present communication. 7.6 In accordance with article 4 (2) (e) of the Optional Protocol, the Committee shall declare a communication inadmissible where the facts that are the subject of the communication occurred prior to the entry into force of the Protocol for the State party concerned, unless those facts continued after that date. 24 In that regard, the Committee observes that, although the alleged offence against the author occurred in 1995, before the date of the entry into force of the Optional Protocol for the State party, the decision of the Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina to open a criminal investigation into the allegations of war crimes came after 2009, that is, after the Optional Protocol had entered into force for the State party. Therefore, the alleged failure of the State party to fulfil its obligations to provide the complainant with redress and an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation occurred after the State party’s recognition of the Committee’s competence under the Optional Protocol. The Committee further notes that the State party does not contest the Committee’s competence ratione temporis. In these circumstances, the Committee considers that it is not precluded ratione temporis from considering the complainant’s allegations regarding violations of her rights under article 4 (2) (e) of the Optional Protocol. __________________ 22 23 24 20-11100 Ibid. E.S. and S.C. v. United Republic of Tanzania (CEDAW/C/60/D/48/2013), para. 6.3; and L.R. v. Republic of Moldova (CEDAW/C/66/D/58/2013), para. 12.2. See Kayhan v. Turkey (CEDAW/C/34/D/8/2005), para. 7.4. 11/16