the defendant in entering into the deal.132 In South-Eastern European participating States, the judge plays an important role in reviewing and determining the validity of plea agreements.133 All maintain some safeguards for protecting the accused’s rights, including the judge’s ability to review and accept or reject a plea agreement.134 In all of those countries, with only one exception, judges are specifically required to assess whether the plea was entered into voluntarily and not coerced in any way,135 and whether the suspect or the accused is aware of the nature and consequences of entering into the agreement.136 In one OSCE participating State in the South Caucasus, judges are required by law to specifically inquire whether the person has been subjected to torture or other ill-treatment.137 59. Despite the legal framework for judicial review, concerns raised in the preceding section over the impact of judicial independence on the exclusion of torture evidence can be mirrored in its impact on trial waivers. Where judges feel compelled to resolve a case with a conviction, they will be dis-incentivized from making any meaningful inquiry into the compliance with pre-trial safeguards or the circumstances in which suspects, accused persons or defendants confessed guilt. Furthermore, even in systems with a high degree of judicial independence, concerns have been raised that judges simply end up “rubber stamping” plea deals. In the two OSCE participating States, which have a high proportion of cases resolved via trial waiver, the review of plea deals is largely a formality, and ensuring voluntariness can be in the form of asking the defendant a simple “yes or no” question.138 Furthermore, while ensuring that defendants have not been subject to coercion or torture during judicial review is good practice, expecting a defendant to allege in an open courtroom that a plea deal was obtained by torture, potentially indicating complicity of the prosecutor present, places a large and potentially unrealistic burden on the defendant at this stage of the process. 132 Questionnaire responses (2019). 133 William Van Caenegem, “Advantages and disadvantages of the adversarial system in criminal proceedings”, p. 77–78. 134 See legislation from e.g. Croatia CPC, Arts. 360–364; North Macedonia CPC, Arts. 483– 490; Serbia CPC, Arts. 313–319; Montenegro CPC, Arts. 300–303; FBiH and BiHRS CPCs, Arts.244–246. 135 See the North Macedonia CPC, Art. 488(2); Kosovo CPC, Art. 233(18.2); Serbia CPC, Art. 317(1); Montenegro CPC, Art. 302(8)(1); BiHRS CPC art.246 (6) (d) and FBiH CPC, Art. 246(6)(a). 136 See the North Macedonia CPC, Art. 488(2); Kosovo CPC, Art. 233(18.1); Serbia CPC, Art. 317(2); Montenegro CPC, Art. 302(8)(3); BiHRS and FBiH CPCs, Art. 246(6)(a). 137 Questionnaire response Georgia Young Lawyers Association (2019). 138 Ibid; and Emilio C. Viano, Plea Bargaining in the United States: a Perversion Of Justice, Revue internationale de droit pénal 2012/1–2 (Vol. 83), pgs. 109–145, para 45. 42