65. The article noted that, because the system is focussed only on numerical targets, officers are incentivized to falsify witness reports and use threats of violence in order to resolve cases and meet targets.145 66. Other post-Soviet states have also retained the quota system. In one South Caucasus OSCE participating State, high conviction rates are reported to guarantee bonuses and promotions for police officers.146 In Central Asia, it is reported that in one state, police may be assessed on the required number of arrests that an officer must make each month or year, and bonuses may be awarded to officers who carry out the largest number of arrests leading to a conviction.147 Police targets are reportedly still based on the number of convictions from the arrests they have made that lead to prison time.148 Amnesty International has reported that these systems, wherever still in place, incentivize the use of unofficial detention and torture.149 67. Positive developments can be observed, however, across the OSCE. For example, one Eastern European OSCE participating State in 2015 eliminated the use of quotas for police.150 In another State in the same region, attempts have been made to evaluate the work of the police according to the level of public confidence.151 Despite this, the system of indicators for police and prosecutors was cited in survey responses as still being one of the principal incentives for torture in this country.152 In 2016, the Subcommittee for the Prevention of Torture reported that it was “alarmed” at the pressure that the police force was under in the very same OSCE participating State to ensure that a high number of crimes were solved, which encouraged the practice of extracting confessions.153 In one Central Asian state surveyed, the Ministry of Internal Affairs has repeatedly showed willingness, 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 46 The Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies, Issue 13 (2012) : Police Brutality & Police Reform in Russia and the CIS, para 26. Ibid. paras 28–29. Questionnaire response Armenia Helsinki Association (2019). Questionnaire response Nota Bene (Tajikistan) (2019). Ibid. Amnesty International, “Statement for Working Session 4: Rule of Law I” Human Dimension Implementation Meeting, (2012). Questionnaire response Promo Lex Association (Moldova) (2019). Questionnaire response Kharkiv Institute for Social Research (Ukraine) (2019) citing Article 11 of the Law of Ukraine “On National Police”. Questionnaire response Ukraine Without Torture (2019). UN OPCAT, ”Report on the visit of the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment to Ukraine” (2016) CAT/OP/UKR/1, para. 22.