CCPR/C/127/D/2654/2015 matter is not being examined under another international procedure of international investigation or settlement. 7.3 The Committee notes the author’s claim that he has exhausted all domestic remedies available to him. In the absence of any objection by the State party in that connection, the Committee considers that the requirements of article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol have been met. 7.4 The Committee notes the author’s claim under articles 13 and 26 of the Covenant that he was unable to appeal the negative decision of the Refugee Appeals Board to a judicial body and that he was discriminated against in the course of the asylum proceedings. In that regard, the Committee refers to its jurisprudence, according to which article 13 offers asylum seekers some of the protection afforded under article 14 of the Covenant but not the right of appeal to judicial bodies.17 The Committee further notes that the author has not explained the basis of his claim under article 26 of the Covenant, that is, why he felt that he had received discriminatory treatment during the procedure before the Board. The Committee therefore concludes that the author has failed to sufficiently substantiate his claims under articles 13 and 26 of the Covenant, and declares this part of the communication inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol. 7.5 With regard to the author’s complaint about the alleged violation of articles 18 and 19 of the Covenant, the Committee notes the State party’s argument that the author’s claims are insufficiently substantiated. It also notes the State party’s statement that the author’s claims under articles 18 and 19 are inadmissible ratione loci and ratione materiae as incompatible with the provisions of the Covenant since articles 18 and 19 do not have extraterritorial application. The Committee observes that the author’s contentions are indeed vague and very limited without advancing any specific arguments in support of his claims. The Committee further recalls that article 2 of the Covenant entails an obligation for States parties not to deport a person from their territory when there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm, such as that contemplated in articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant, in the country to which removal is to be effected. Accordingly, the Committee considers that the author’s communication falls short of substantiating how his rights under articles 18 and 19 would be violated by the State party were he to be removed to Myanmar and how such removal would pose a substantial risk of irreparable harm such as that contemplated under articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant. This part of the communication is therefore inadmissible pursuant to article 2 of the Optional Protocol. 7.6 The Committee notes the author’s claims that he would face torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment if removed to Myanmar, owing to his Kachin ethnicity. He submits that Kachins are ordered to engage in forced labour by the armed forces in his country of origin. The Committee also takes note of his assertion that, should he be returned to Myanmar, he would be requested to provide information to the border authorities about Kachin refugees’ activities abroad and that he would be subjected to ill-treatment in case of resistance or non-compliance. 7.7 The Committee recalls paragraph 12 of its general comment No. 31, in which it refers to the obligation of States parties not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove a person from their territory when there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm, such as that contemplated in articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant.18 The Committee has also indicated that the risk must be personal and that there is a high threshold for providing substantial grounds to establish that a real risk of irreparable harm exists. 19 Thus, all relevant facts and circumstances must be considered, including the general human rights situation in the author’s country of origin. 20 The Committee recalls that it is generally for the organs of States parties to examine the facts 17 18 19 20 See, for example, D and E v. Denmark (CCPR/C/119/D/2293/2013), para. 6.8; A and B v. Denmark (CCPR/C/117/D/2291/2013), para. 7.3; and X v. Denmark (CCPR/C/110/D/2007/2010), para. 8.5. See also A v. Denmark (CCPR/C/116/D/2357/2014), para. 7.4. See, for example, A and B v. Denmark, para. 8.3. Ibid. See also X v. Norway (CCPR/C/115/D/2474/2014), para. 7.3; and X v. Canada (CCPR/C/115/D/2366/2014), para. 9.3. 7