CAT/C/60/D/681/2015 the Committee’s rules of procedure. The Committee recalls that for a claim to be admissible under article 22 of the Convention and rule 113 (b) of its rules of procedure, it must rise to the basic level of substantiation required for purposes of admissibility. 18 The Committee considers that the complainant has sufficiently detailed the facts and the basis of his claims under article 3 of the Convention to enable the Committee to make a decision, and therefore considers that his claims are sufficiently substantiated for the purpose of admissibility. 7.3 The Committee notes that the State party does not challenge the admissibility of the complaint on any other grounds and it therefore finds no obstacles to admissibility. Accordingly, the Committee declares the complaint admissible and proceeds with its consideration on the merits. Consideration of the merits 8.1 The Committee has considered the communication in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties concerned, in accordance with article 22 (4) of the Convention. 8.2 In the present case, the issue before the Committee is whether the removal of the complainant to Afghanistan would constitute a violation of the State party’s obligation under article 3 (1) of the Convention not to expel or return (“refouler”) a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be at risk of being subjected to torture. 8.3 The Committee must evaluate whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the complainant would be personally in danger of being subjected to torture upon return to Afghanistan. In assessing this risk, the Committee must take into account all relevant considerations, pursuant to article 3 (2) of the Convention, including the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. However, the Committee recalls that the aim of such determination is to establish whether the individual concerned would be personally at a foreseeable and real risk of being subjected to torture in the country to which he or she would be returned. 19 It follows that the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute sufficient reason for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture upon return to that country. Additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk. Conversely, the absence of a consistent pattern of flagrant violations of human rights does not mean that a person might not be subjected to torture in his or her specific circumstances. 20 8.4 The Committee also recalls its general comment No. 1 and reaffirms that the existence of a risk of torture must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory or suspicion. Although the risk does not have to be shown to be highly probable, 21 the burden of proof generally falls on the complainant, who must present an arguable case establishing that he or she is at “foreseeable, real and personal risk”. 22 The Committee gives considerable weight to findings of fact that are made by the organs of the State party concerned, while at the same time it is not bound by such findings and instead has the 18 19 20 21 22 8 See, inter alia, communication No. 308/2006, K.A. v. Sweden, decision of inadmissibility of 16 November 2007, para. 7.2. See, inter alia, communication No. 470/2011, X. v. Switzerland, decision adopted on 24 November 2014. See, inter alia, communication No. 490/2012, E.K.W. v. Finland, decision adopted on 4 May 2015, para. 9.3. See general comment No. 1, para. 6. See, inter alia, communications No. 203/2002, A.R. v. the Netherlands, decision adopted on 14 November 2003, para. 7.3; No. 258/2004, Dadar v. Canada, decision adopted on 23 November 2005, para. 8.4; No. 343/2008, Kalonzo v. Canada, decision adopted on 18 May 2012, para. 9.3; No. 458/2011, X. v. Denmark, decision adopted on 28 November 2014, para. 9.3; and No. 520/2012, W.G.D. v. Canada, decision adopted on 26 November 2014, para. 8.4.