treatment (lack of food and clothing) and torture (beatings, "plantones") and that over a period of six months they were allowed to leave their cells for 15 minutes of recreation only eight times. In La Paloma he was again forced to sign a written declaration that he had not been mistreated and subjected to torture. The author states that in February 1976 he was brought before a military judge for interrogation and in June 1976 he was again brought before the same judge who ordered his release subject to appearance at a later stage. He was, however, still kept in detention. He claims that he never had any legal assistance, that he was never tried as no charges were brought against him, and that he was informed by the court that, if he made any change to his previous written statements, he would be tried for perjury which was an offence punishable by imprisonment for a period of from three months to eight years. He further alleges that on 1 July 1976 he was trans­ ferred to disciplinary block " B " in another sector of La Paloma where there were nine cells, the largest measur­ ing 1.2 by 2 metres with two prisoners in each cell. such remedies and the communication would therefore not be considered inadmissible in so far as exhaustion of domestic remedies was concerned, unless the State party gave details of the remedies which it submitted had been available to the author in the circumstances of his case, together with evidence that there would be a reasonable prospect that such remedies would be effective. 6. By letter dated 5 April 1978 Mr. Torres Ramirez informed the Committee that his case had been withdrawn from consideration by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. 7. By letter dated 14 April 1978 the State party sub­ mitted information which consisted of a general descrip­ tion of the rights available to accused persons in the military criminal tribunals and of the domestic remedies at their disposal as means of protecting and safeguard­ ing their rights under the Uruguayan judicial system. However, it did not specify which remedies were available to the author in the particular circumstances of his case. 8. By letter dated 20 May 1978 Mr. Torres Ramirez submitted that the remedies listed by the State party were not applicable in his case because he had not been put on trial and he was barred from recourse to habeas corpus because he was detained under the "prompt security measures". He pointed out that none of the other remedies listed by the State party could have been utihzed in the situation. He states that on 6 August 1976 he was released and one month later he obtained political asylum in Mexico. Mr. Torres Ramirez claims that the way he was treated during his detention virtually excluded any possibility of his having recourse to a legal counsel. With regard to the exhaustion of domestic remedies he comments that the only decision which the court made in his case was the one ordering his release; conse­ quently he states that recourse to habeas corpus was not apphcable to his case, since he was detained under the "prompt security measures". 9. On 25 July 1978, the Human Rights Committee, (a) Having concluded that article 5 (2) (a) of the Pro­ tocol did not preclude it from declaring the communica­ tion admissible, although the sarne matter had been sub­ mitted to another procedure of international investi­ gation or settlement, if the matter had been withdrawn from and was no longer under active consideration in the other body at the time of the Committee's decision on admissibiHty, Ф) Having concluded that article 5 (2) ф) of the Pro­ tocol did not preclude it from considering a communica­ tion received under the Protocol where the allegations themselves raise issues concerning the availability or effectiveness of domestic remedies and the State party, when expressly requested to do so by the Committee, did not provide details on the availability and effec­ tiveness of domestic remedies in the particular case under consideration. Finally, Mr. Torres Ramirez states that he did not receive any compensation after his release. He submits, therefore, that he was a victim of viola­ tions of articles 7, 9 (1), (3) and (5), 10 (1) and (3), 14 (3) Ф), (c), (d), {e) and (g), 18 (1) and (2) and 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Pohtical Rights. 3. On 26 August 1977, the Human Rights Commit­ tee decided to transmit the communication to the State party, under rule 91 of the provisional rules of pro­ cedure, requesting information and observations rele­ vant to the question of admissibility. 4. By letter dated 27 October 1977 the State party objected to the admissibility of the communication on two grounds: (a) The same matter was already being examined by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights; Ф) The alleged victim had not exhausted all available domestic remedies. Therefore decided: {a) That the communication was admissible; Ф) That the text of this decision be transmitted to the State party, together with the text of the relevant documents, and to the author; (c) That, in accordance with article 4 (2) of the Op­ tional Protocol, the State party be requested to submit to the Committee, within six months of the date of the transmittal to it of this decision, written explanations or statements clarifying the matter and the remedy, if any, that may have been taken by it. 5. On 26 January 1978, the Human Rights Commit­ tee informed the State party that, in the absence of more specific information concerning the domestic remedies said to be available to the author of this communica­ tion, and the effectiveness of those remedies as enforced by the competent authorities in Uruguay, the Commit­ tee was unable to accept that he had failed to exhaust 10. On 18 April 1979, the Committee decided to re­ mind the State party that the six-month time-limit for 50