5. The Committee found, on the basis of the infor­ mation before it, that it was not precluded by article 5 (2) (a) of the Optional Protocol from considering the communication. The Committee was also unable to conclude that there were effective domestic remedies available to the alleged victims in the circumstances of their case, which they had failed to exhaust. Since, furthermore, no other procedural impediment had emerged, the Human Rights Committee declared the communication admissible on 24 April 1979. derogations were strictly necessary. Instead, the Government of Uruguay declared that more informa­ tion would be provided in connection with the submis­ sion of the country's report under article 40 of the Cov­ enant. To date neither has this report been received, nor the information by which it was to be supplemented. 8.3 Although the sovereign right of a State party to declare a state of emergency is not questioned, yet, in the specific context of the present communication, the Human Rights Committee is of the opinion that a State, by merely invoking the existence of exceptional cir­ cumstances, cannot evade the obligations which it has undertaken by ratifying the Covenant. Although the substantive right to take derogatory measures may not depend on a formal notification being made pursuant to article 4 (3) of the Covenant, the State party concerned is duty-bound to give a sufficiently detailed account of the relevant facts when it invokes article 4 (1) of the Covenant in proceedings under the Optional Protocol. It is the function of the Human Rights Committee, act­ ing under the Optional Protocol, to see to it that States parties live up to their commitments under the Cov­ enant. In order to discharge this function and to assess whether a situation of the kind described in article 4(1) of the Covenant exists in the country concerned, it needs full and comprehensive information. If the respondent Government does not furnish the required justification itself, as it is required to do under article 4 (2) of the Op­ tional Protocol and article 4 (3) of the Covenant, the Human Rights Committee cannot conclude that valid reasons exist to legitimize a departure from the normal legal régime prescribed by the Covenant. 6. On 10 July 1980, the State party submitted its observations under article 4 (2) of the Optional Pro­ tocol. Essentiahy, it invoked article 4 of the Covenant in the following terms: The Government of Uruguay wishes to inform the Committee that it has availed itself of the right of derogation provided for in article 4 (3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Secretary-General of the United Nations was informed of this decision and, through him, notes were sent to the States parties containing the notification of the Uruguayan State. Nevertheless, the Government of Uruguay wishes to state that it reiterates the information given on that occasion, namely that the requirements of article 4 (2) of the Cov­ enant are being strictly complied with—requirements whose purpose is precisely to ensure the real, effective and lasting defence of human rights, the enjoyment and promotion of which constitute the basis of our existence as an independent, sovereign nation. Article 25, on which the authors of the communication argue their case, is not men­ tioned in the text of article 4 (2). Accordingly, the Government of Uruguay, as it has a right to do, has temporarily derogated from some provisions relating to political parties. Nevertheless, as is stated in the third preambular paragraph of Act N o . 4, dated 1 September 1976, it is the firm intention of the authorities to restore political life. 7. The Committee has considered the present com­ munication in the light of all information made available to it by the parties, as provided for in article 5 (1) of the Optional Protocol. 8.4 In addition, even on the assumption that there exists a situation of emergency in Uruguay, the Human Rights Committee does not see what ground could be adduced to support the contention that, in order to restore peace and order, it was necessary to deprive ah citizens, who as members of certain political groups had been candidates in the elections of 1966 and 1971, of any political right for a period as long as 15 years. This measure applies to everyone, without distinction as to whether he sought to promote his pohtical opinions by peaceful means or by resorting to, or advocating the use of, violent means. The Government of Uruguay has failed to show that the interdiction of any kind of political dissent is required in order to deal with the alleged emergency situation and pave the way back to political freedom. 8.1 Although the Government of Uruguay, in its submission of 10 July 1980, has invoked article 4 of the Covenant in order to justify the ban imposed on the authors of the communication, the Human Rights Com­ mittee feels unable to accept that the requirements set forth in article 4 (1) of the Covenant have been met. 8.2 According to article 4 (1) of the Covenant, the States parties may take measures derogating from their obligations under that instrument in a situation of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which has been formahy pro­ claimed. Even in such circumstances, derogations are only permissible to the extent strictly required by the ex­ igencies of the situation. In its note of 28 June 1979 to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (repro­ duced in document CCPR/C/2/Add.3, p. 4), which was designed to comply with the formal requirements laid down in article 4 (3) of the Covenant, the Government of Uruguay has made reference to an emergency situa­ tion in the country which was legally acknowledged in a number of "Institutional Acts". However, no factual details were given at that time. The note confined itself to stating that the existence of the emergency situation was " a matter of universal knowledge"; no attempt was made to indicate the nature and the scope of the deroga­ tions actually resorted to with regard to the rights guaranteed by the Covenant, or to show that such 9. The Human Rights Committee, acting under ar­ ticle 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, is of the view that, by prohibiting the authors of the communication from engaging in any kind of political activity for a period as long as 15 years, the State party has unreasonably restricted their rights under article 25 of the Covenant. 10. Accordingly, the Human Rights Committee is of the view that the State party concerned is under an obligation to take steps with a view to enabhng Jorge Landinelli Silva, Luis E. Echave Zas, Omar Patrón Zeballos, Niuska Sala Fernández and Rafael Guarga Ferro to participate again in the political life of the na­ tion. 66