there any dispute in this case concerning the due obser­ vance by the State party of the procedural safeguards laid down in article 13. The only question is whether the expulsion was "in accordance with law". 9.3 The reference to "law" in this context is to the domestic law of the State party concerned, which in the present case is Swedish law, though of course the rele­ vant provisions of domestic law must in themselves be compatible with the provisions of the Covenant. Ar­ ticle 13 requires compliance with both the substantive and the procedural requirements of the law. authorities of the State party in question have inter­ preted and applied the domestic law correctly in the case before it under the Optional Protocol, unless it is established that they have not interpreted and applied it in good faith or that it is evident that there has been an abuse of power. 10.2 In the hght of all written information made available to it by the individual and the explanations and observations of the State party concerned, the Committee is satisfied that in reaching the decision to expel Anna Maroufidou the Swedish authorities did in­ terpret and apply the relevant provisions of Swedish law in good faith and in a reasonable manner and conse­ quently that the decision was made "in accordance with law" as required by article 13 of the Covenant. 10.1 Anna Maroufidou claims that the decision to expel her was in violation of article 13 of the Covenant because it was not "in accordance with law". In her submission it was based on an incorrect interpretation of the Swedish Aliens Act. The Committee takes the view that the interpretation of domestic law is essen­ tially a matter for the courts and authorities of the State party concerned. It is not within the powers or functions of the Committee to evaluate whether the competent 11. The Human Rights Committee acting under ar­ ticle 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is therefore of the view that the above facts do not disclose any viola­ tion of the Covenant and in particular of article 13. THIRTEENTH SESSION Communication No. 24/1977 Submitted by: Sandra Lovelace on 29 December 1977 Alleged victim: The author State party: Canada Date of adoption of views: 30 July 1981 (thirteenth session) Concept of victim—Events prior to entry into force of Covenant and Optional Protocol—Minorities—In­ dian Act—Sex discrimination—Protection of the family—Right to marry—Right of residence was not required to exhaust local remedies since the Supreme Court of Canada, in The Attorney-General of Canada v. Jeanette Lavell, Richard Isaac et al. V.Yvonne Bédard[1974] S.C.R. 1349, held that decision 12 (1) (è) was fully operative, irrespective of its incon­ sistency with the Canadian Bill of Rights on account of discrimination based on sex. Articles of Covenant 2 (1), 3, 12 (1) and (3). 17. 23 (1), 24, 26 and 27 Views under article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol'y ^ 2. By its decision of 18 July 1978 the Human Rights Committee transmitted the communication, under rule 91 of the provisional rules of procedure, to the State party concerned, requesting information and observa­ tions relevant to the question of admissibility of the communication. This request for information and observations was reiterated by a decision of the Com­ mittee's Working Group, dated 6 April 1979. 1. The author of the communication dated 29 December 1977 and supplemented by letters of 17 April 1978, 28 November 1979 and 20 June 1980, is a 32-year-old woman, living in Canada. She was born and registered as "Mahseet Indian" but has lost her rights and status as an Indian in accordance with section 12 (1) (6) of the Indian Act, after having married a non-Indian on 23 May 1970. Pointing out that an Indian man who marries a non-Indian woman does not lose his Indian status, she claims that the Act is discriminatory on the grounds of sex and contrary to articles 2 (1), 3, 23 (1) and (4), 26 and 27 of the Covenant. As to the ad­ missibility of the communication, she contends that she 3. By its decision of 14 August 1979 the Human Rights Committee declared the communication admiss­ ible and requested the author of the communication to submit additional information concerning her age and her marriage, which had not been indicated in the original submission. At that time no information or observations had been received from the State party concerning the question of admissibility of the com­ munication. ' Pursuant to rule 85 of the provisional rules of procedure, Mr. Walter Surma Tarnopolsky, did not participate in the consideration of this communication or in the adoption of the views of the Committee under article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol in this matter. 4. In its submission dated 26 September 1979 relating to the admissibility of the communication, the State party informed the Committee that it had no com- ' The text of an individual opinion submitted by a Committee member is appended t o these views. 83