with other violations of the Military Penal Code in con­ junction with the ordinary Penal Code. She was ordered to be tried by a Military Court. She was ordered to be kept in "preventive custody" and assigned an ex officio defence lawyer. Article 14 (3) (c), because she was not tried without un­ due delay. 12. The Committee, accordingly, is of the view that the State party is under an obligation, pursuant to ar­ ticle 2 (3) of the Covenant, to provide Lihan Celiberti de Casariego with effective remedies, including her im­ mediate release, permission to leave the country and compensation for the violations which she has suffered, and to take steps to ensure that similar violations do not occur in the future. 10.1 The Human Rights Committee observes that although the arrest and initial detention of Lilian Celiberti de Casariego ahegedly took place on foreign territory, the Committee is not barred either by virtue of article 1 of the Optional Protocol ("... individuals sub­ ject to its jurisdiction ...") or by virtue of article 2 (l)of the Covenant ("... individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction ...") from considering these allegations, together with the claim of subsequent ab­ duction into Uruguayan territory, inasmuch as these acts were perpetrated by Uruguayan agents acting on foreign soil. 10.2 The reference in article 1 of the Optional Pro­ tocol to "individuals subject to its jurisdiction" does not affect the above conclusion because the reference in that article is not to the place where the violation oc­ curred, but rather to the relationship between the in­ dividual and the State in relation to a violation of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant, wherever they oc­ curred. 10.3 Article 2 (1) of the Covenant places an obliga­ tion upon a State party to respect and to ensure rights "to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction", but it does not imply that the State party concerned cannot be held accountable for violations of rights under the Covenant which its agents commit upon the territory of another State, whether with the ac­ quiescence of the Government of that State or in op­ position to it. According to article 5 (1) of the Cov­ enant: APPENDIX Individual opinion submitted by a member of the H u m a n Rights Committee under rule 94 (3) of the Committee's provisional rules of procedure Communication No. 56/1979 Individual opinion appended to the Committee's views at the re­ quest of Mr. Christian Tomuschat: I concur in the views expressed by the majority. N o n e the less, the arguments set out in paragraph 10 for affirming the applicability of the Covenant also with regard to those events which have taken place outside Uruguay need to be clarified and expanded. Indeed, the first sentence in paragraph 10.3, according to which article 2 (1) of the Covenant does not imply that a State party "cannot be held accountable for violations of rights under the Covenant which its agents commit upon the territory of another State", is too broadly framed and might therefore give rise to misleading conclusions. In principle, the scope of application of the Covenant is not suscep­ tible to being extended by reference to article 5, a provision de­ signed to cover instances where formally rules under the Covenant seem to legitimize actions which substantially run counter to its pur­ poses and general spirit. Thus, Governments may never use the hmitation clauses supplementing the protected rights and freedoms to such an extent that the very substance of those rights and freedoms would be annihilated; individuals are legally barred from avaihng themselves of the same rights and freedoms with a view to over­ throwing the régime of the rule of law which constitutes the basic philosophy of the Covenant. In the present case, however, the Covenant does not even provide the pretext for a "right" to perpetrate the criminal acts which, according to the Committee's conviction, have been perpetrated by the Uruguayan authorities. Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or per­ form any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognized herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the present Covenant. T o construe the words "within its territory" pursuant to their strict literal meaning as excluding any responsibihty for conduct oc­ curring beyond the national boundaries would, however, lead to ut­ terly absurd results. The formula was intended to take care of ob­ jective difficulties which might impede the implementation of the Covenant in specific situations. Thus, a State party is normally unable to ensure the effective enjoyment of the rights under the Covenant to its citizens abroad, having at its disposal only the tools of diplomatic protection with their limited potential. Instances of occupation of foreign territory offer another example of situations which the drafters of the Covenant had in mind when they confined the obligation of States parties to their own territory. All these fac­ tual patterns have in common, however, that they provide plausible grounds for denying the protection of the Covenant. It may be con­ cluded, therefore, that it was the intention of the drafters, whose sovereign decision cannot be challenged, to restrict the territorial scope of the Covenant in view of such situations where enforcing the Covenant would be hkely to encounter exceptional obstacles. Never was it envisaged, however, to grant States parties unfettered discretionary power to carry out wilful and deliberate attacks against the freedom and personal integrity of their citizens living abroad. Consequently, despite the wording of article 2 (1), the events which took place outside Uruguay come within the purview of the Covenant. In line with this, it would be unconscionable to so inter­ pret the responsibility under article 2 of the Covenant as to permit a State party to perpetrate violations of the Covenant on the territory of another State, which viola­ tions it could not perpetrate on its own territory. 11. The Human Rights Committee, acting under ar­ ticle 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is of the view that the facts as found by the Committee, disclose viola­ tions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in particular of: Article 9 (1), because the act of abduction into Uruguayan territory constituted an arbitrary arrest and detention; Article 10 (1), because Lihan Cehberti de Casariego was kept incommunicado for four months; Article 14 (3) (6), because she had no counsel of her own choosing; 94