derogation. Moreover, some of tiie facts referred to above raise issues under provisions from wiiich the Covenant does not allow any derogation under any cir­ cumstances. Article 9 (1), because he was not released for six weeks after his release was ordered by the mihtary judge; Article 9 (4), because recourse to habeas corpus was not apphcable in his case; 18. The Human Rights Committee acting under ar­ ticle 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is of the view that these facts, in so far as they continued or have occurred after 23 March 1976 (the date on which the Covenant entered into force in respect of Uruguay), disclose violations of the Covenant, in particular of: Articles 7 and 10 (1), because of the treatment he received up to June 1976; Article 14 (3), because he did not have access to legal assistance. 19. The Commhtee, accordingly, is of the view that the State party is under an obligation to provide the vic­ tim with effective remedies, including compensation, for the violations which he has suffered and to take steps to ensure that similar violations do not occur in the future. Communication No. 6/1977 Submitted by: Miguel A. Millán Sequeira on 16 February 1977 Alleged victim: The author State party: Uruguay Date of adoption of views: 29 July 1980 (tenth session) Submission to lACHR—Same matter—Exhaustion of domestic remedies—Review of admissibility deci­ sion—Detention incommunicado—Access to counsel —Habeas corpus—Procedural delays—Extension of time for State party's observations—Views in default of State party's submission—Events prior to entry in­ to force of Covenant—Derogation from Covenant December 1975 and on 2 June 1976) but that no steps were taken to commit him for trial or to release him. On 4 June 1976 the author claims that he gained his freedom by escaping. The author claims that the follow­ ing provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights have been violated by the Uruguayan authorities: articles 7, 9, 10, 14 (1), (2), (3), 18 (1), (2), 19 (1), (2). Articles of Covenant: 4, 9 (3) and (4) and 14 (1) and (3) 3. The author maintains that in practice there are no domestic remedies available in Uruguay because when applicable they are subjected to a very restrictive inter­ pretation by the authorities concerned. He further states that the right of habeas corpus is denied to persons de­ tained under "prompt security measures" (Medidas prontas de seguridad), which, he claims, constitutes an abusive interpretation of article 168 (17) of the Con­ stitution. In addition, guarantees set forth in that article are allegedly never observed. He claims that he had no access to legal assistance while he was kept in detention, since the right to defence is not recognized by the authorities until a prosecution has been initiated. He states that he has not submitted his case to any other in­ ternational organization. Articles of Optional Protocol: 4 (2) and 5 (2) (a) and (b) Views under article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol 1. The author of this communication (initial letter dated 16 February 1977 and further letters dated 20 October 1977 and 4 April and 18 May 1978) is a Uruguayan national, residing in Mexico. He was twenty years old at the time of the submission of the com­ munication in 1977. 2. The author states that he was arrested in Uruguay in April and released in May 1975 and that he was then rearrested on 18 September 1975 and detained until he escaped from custody on 4 June 1976. On both occas­ ions, those apprehending him indicated that the reason for his arrests was that he was suspected of being a militant communist, which he denied. He alleges that he was subjected to torture during the first period of deten­ tion and again during the first 15 days after he was re­ arrested. He describes the alleged torture methods in some detail and named several officers responsible for the treatment. The author alleges that after he was rear­ rested he was initially kept incommunicado for 65 days and thereafter transferred to El Cilindro sports stadium in Montevideo which he claims was used for lowsecurity political detainees and where he remained for six months. He states that he was brought before a military judge on three occasions (23 October and 12 4. On 26 August 1977, the Human Rights Commit­ tee decided to transmit the communication to the State party, under rule 91 of the provisional rules of pro­ cedure, requesting information and observations rele­ vant to the question of admissibility. 5. By a note dated 27 October 1977, the State party objected to the admissibility of the communication on two grounds: (а) The same matter had already been examined by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights under cases Nos. 1968 and 2109; (б) The alleged victim had not exhausted all available domestic remedies. 52