arm paralysed, leg injuries and infected eyes) and substantial loss of weight. 15. The Human Rights Committee is aware that under the legislation of many countries criminal of­ fenders may be deprived of certain pohtical rights. Ac­ cordingly, article 25 of the Covenant only prohibits "unreasonable" restrictions. In no case, however, may a person be subjected to such sanctions solely because of his or her political opinion (arts. 2 (1) and 26). Further­ more, in the circumstances of the present case there is no justification for such a deprivation of ah political rights for a period of 15 years. Ismael Weinberger was first brought before a judge and charged on 16 December 1976, almost 10 months after his arrest. On 14 August 1979, three and a half years after his arrest, he was sentenced to eight years of imprisonment by the Military judge of the Court of First Instance for "subversive association" (art. 60 (V) of the Military Penal Code) with aggravating cir­ cumstances of conspiracy against the Constitution. The concrete factual basis of this offence has not been ex­ plained by the Government of Uruguay, although the author of the communication claims that the true reasons were that his brother had contributed informa­ tion on trade-union activities to a newspaper opposed to the Government and his membership in a political party which had lawfully existed while the membership lasted. The Committee further notes in this connection that the State party did not comply with the Committee's re­ quest to enclose copies of any court orders or decisions of relevance to the matter under consideration. Ismael Weinberger was not granted the assistance of counsel during the first 10 months of his detention. Neither the alleged victim nor his counsel had the right to be present at the trial, the proceedings being conducted in writing. The judgement handed down against him was not made public. 16. The Human Rights Committee acting under ar­ ticle 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is of the view that these facts, in so far as they have occurred after 23 March 1976 (the date on which the Covenant entered in­ to force in respect of Uruguay), disclose violations of the Covenant, in particular of: Articles 7 and 10 (1), because of the severe treatment which Ismael Weinberger received during the first 10 months of his detention; Article 9 (3), because he was not brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and because he was not tried within a reasonable time; Article 9 (4), because recourse to habeas corpus was not available to him; Article 14 (1), because he had no fair and public hearing and because the judgement rendered against him was not made public; Article 14 (3), because he did not have access to legal assistance during the first 10 months of his detention and was not tried in his presence; Article 15 (1), because the penal law was applied retroactively against him; Article 19 (2), because he was detained for having disseminated information relating to trade-union ac­ tivities; Article 25, because he is barred from taking part in the conduct of public affairs and from being elected for 15 years in accordance with Acta Institucional No. 4 of 1 September 1976. 17. The Committee, accordingly, is of the view that the State party is under an obligation to provide the vic­ tim with effective remedies, including his immediate release and compensation for the violations which he has suffered and to take steps to ensure that similar violations do not occur in the future. Pursuant to Acta Institucional No. 4 of 1 September 1976, Ismael Weinberger is deprived of the right to engage in political activities for 15 years. 13. As regards the treatment to which Ismael Weinberger has been subjected, the Committee notes that the State party did not at all comment thereon in its submission of 10 July 1980. 14. The Human Rights Committee has considered whether acts and treatment, which are prima facie not in conformity with the Covenant, could for any reasons be justified under the Covenant in the circumstances. The Government has referred to provisions of Uruguayan law, including the "prompt security measures". The Covenant (art. 4) allows national measures derogating from some of its provisions only in strictly defined cir­ cumstances, and the Government has not made any sub­ missions of fact or law to justify such derogation. Moreover, some of the facts referred to above raise issues under provisions from which the Covenant does not allow any derogation under any circumstances. 60