subsequently stood trial on charges including "bodily injuries with death as a result" and on 30 January 1981 he was convicted by the Eastern Court of Appeal {Oestre Landsret), sitting with a jury, and sentenced to three and a half years' imprisonment. The author ap­ plied to the Special Court for Revision {Den saerlige klageret) for a new trial. The Court rejected the request on 4 December 1981. Rights and therefore by another procedure of interna­ tional investigation within the meaning of article 5 (2) (a) of the Optional Protocol to the International Cov­ enant on Civil and Political Rights, the Committee con­ cludes that it is not competent to consider the present communication. 7. The Human Rights Committee, accordingly, decides: 2.3 On 21 April 1981, A. M. was informed by the Danish immigration authorities that he would have to leave Denmark after serving his sentence. This decision was upheld by the Ministry of Justice and A. M. was so informed on 23 October 1981. He states that he is due to be released from prison on 15 August 1982 and that he will be deported on that date. That the communication is inadmissible. 8. This decision shall be communicated to the author of the communication and, for information, to the State party concerned. APPENDIX Individual opinion 3.1 The author claims before the Human Rights Committee that he has been unjustly treated because he is a foreigner. He alleges that the police were dishonest in the conduct of pre-trial investigations into the matter and that the Court denied him a fair trial by giving un­ due weight to evidence against him, including testimony allegedly obtained from his Pakistani enemies in Den­ mark. He believes that a fair assessment of the evidence would have led to his acquittal. The author further claims that the decision of the Danish authorities to deport him upon release from prison constitutes degrading treatment and punishment. Mr. Bernhard Graefratli, member of tlie Human Riglits Commit­ tee, submits the following individual opinion relating to the ad­ missibiHty of communication N o . 121/1982 (A. M. v. Denmarlc): 1 concur in the decision of the Committee that the communication is inadmissible. However, in my view the communication is inadmissible in accordance with article 3 of the Optional Protocol. The claims of the author do not raise issues under any of the provisions of the Cov­ enant. I cannot, however, share the view that the Committee is barred from considering the communication by the reservation of Denmark relating to article 5 (2) (a) of the Optional Protocol. That reservation refers to matters that have already been considered under other pro­ cedures of international investigation. It does not in my opinion refer to matters, the consideration of which has been denied under any other procedure by a decision of inadmissibility. 3.2 In particular he claims to be a victim of breaches by Denmark of articles 5, 7 and 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as regards the right not to be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment, the right to equality before the law and the right to a fair trial. He also invokes article 11 (a) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights concerning the presump­ tion of innocence. These articles correspond, in substance, to articles 7, 14 and 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 4. It appears from the communication that the author has submitted the same matter to the European Commission of Human Rights. His application before that body was declared inadmissible on 1 March 1982 as manifestly ill-founded. 5. Before considering any claims contained in a communication, the Human Rights Committee must decide whether the communication is admissible under the Optional Protocol to the Universal Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Committee observes in this connection that, when ratifying the Optional Pro­ tocol and recognizing the competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications from in­ dividuals subject to its jurisdiction, the State party Den­ mark made a reservation, with reference to article 5 (2) {a) of the Optional Protocol, in respect of the com­ petence of the Committee to consider a communication from an individual if the matter has already been con­ sidered under other procedures of international in­ vestigation. In the case of the author of communication N o . 121/1982, the European Commission of Human rights has declared his application inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded. It has thereby found that it has no competence^ to consider the matter within the legal framework of the European Convention. A n appUcation that has been declared inadmissible has not, in the meaning of the reservation, been "considered" in such a way that the Human Rights Committee is precluded from considering it. The reservation aims at preventing the Human Rights Committee from reviewing cases that have been considered by another interna­ tional organ of investigation. It does not seek to limit the competence of the Human Rights Committee to deal with communications merely on the ground that the rights of the Covenant allegedly violated may also be covered by the European Convention and its procedural re­ quirements. If that had been the aim of the reservation, it would, in my opinion, have been incompatible with the Optional Protocol. If the Committee interprets the reservation in such a way that it would be excluded from considering a communication when a com­ plaint referring to the same facts has been declared inadmissible under the procedure of the European Convention, the effect would be that any complaint that has been declared inadmissible under that pro­ cedure could later o n not be considered by the Human Rights C o m ­ mittee, despite the fact that the conditions for admissibility of com­ munications are set out in a separate international instrument and are different from those under the Optional Protocol. An application that has been declared inadmissible under the system of the European Convention is not necessarily inadmissible under the system of the Covenant and the Optional Protocol, even if it refers to the same facts. This is also true in relation to an application that has been declared inadmissible by the European Commission as being manifestly ill-founded. The decision that an application is manifestly ill-founded can necessarily be taken only in relation to rights set forth in the European Convention. These rights, however, differ in substance and in regard to their implementation procedures from the rights set forth in the Covenant. They, as well as the competence of the European Commission, derive from a separate and independent international instrument. A decision on non-admissibility of the Euro­ pean Commission, therefore, has n o impact on a matter before the Human Rights Committee and cannot hinder the Human Rights C o m - 6. In the light of the above-mentioned reservation and observing that the same matter has already been considered by the European Commission of Human 33