Compendium of Standards, Good Practices and Recommendations Third, effective civilian control and accountability of the armed forces – a fundamental requirement of democracy and the rule of law – requires a separation of the political and military spheres. If members of the armed forces can intervene in the political sphere in an active and visible way, this may undermine democratic accountability and create conflicts of interest. Consequently, restrictions may be necessary to prevent the active involvement of armed forces members in politics. Although democratic societies usually regard a person’s political views as a private affair, there also may be a limited case for excluding people with extreme political views or associations from membership of the armed forces.136 This is because such political associations are regarded as lacking the commitment of other political parties to the constitutional order. The need for restrictions in public service on people with extreme political views has, for example, been recognized as a justifiable ground for restricting civil and political rights under the ECHR. During the Cold War, the European Court of Human Rights accepted some political restrictions on state employment in cases of political affiliations that were considered to demonstrate a lack of commitment to a “free 137 democratic system”. The case for limited “lustration” provisions was similarly accepted 138 in transitional states after 1989. In response to the ODIHR questionnaire, Azerbaijan, the Czech Republic, Germany, Latvia, Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden and Switzerland reported applying restrictions on service in the armed forces for individuals holding extremist views. Some countries (for example, Germany) take the view that the best education in democratic practice for members of the armed forces is through active citizenship. They therefore impose minimal restrictions on political activities. Where restrictions are imposed on the political activities of service personnel, they must be proportionate to the objectives of securing constitutional order or protecting military discipline. Moreover, these restrictions should be legally grounded in a way that makes them transparent, predictable and capable of being judicially reviewed. For example, a restriction on active participation in national 136 The questionnaire responses provided no common definition of “extreme”. Therefore, “extreme political views” are generically understood as those that, if enacted, would undermine the established democratic constitutional order, and “extreme associations” are understood as purposeful engagement with those who are actively attempting to enact “extreme” views. 137 See: European Court of Human Rights, Glasenapp v. the Federal Republic of Germany (Application no. 9228/80, judgment of 28 August 1986); and Kosiek v. the Federal Republic of Germany (Application no. 9704/82, judgment of 28 August 1986). In both cases, the Court found no violation of Article 10 because it considered the real issue to be that of access to the civil service, which was not protected by the Convention (as it was then interpreted). By contrast, in Vogt v. Germany (Application no. 17851/91, judgment of 26 September 1995), a teacher dismissed for actively campaigning for the Communist Party successfully invoked Article 10. Restrictions on members of the Armed Forces would, however, be easier for a state to defend under limitations for national security under Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR. 138 See: Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), “Resolution 1096 (1996) on Measures to Dismantle the Heritage of Former Communist Totalitarian Systems”, 27 June 1996. European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence is summarized in Ivanovski v. the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Application no. 29908/11, judgment of 21 January 2016). See also: James A. Sweeney, The European Court of Human Rights in the post-Cold War Era: Universality in Transition (Oxon, New York: Routledge, 2012), Chapter 5. 77