Advance unedited version CCPR/C/132/D/2615/2015 6.4 However, the Committee notes that the author: a) filed two first information reports in December 2014 before the District Police Office and the District Administration Office in Kanchanpur, respectively, and that her requests to register the reports were both denied on the basis of the 35-day statute of limitations for filing a criminal report about rape; b) filed a claim for compensation in December 2014 before the Kanchanpur District Court, which also refused to register the claim because it was time-barred; and c) filed a writ of mandamus on 22 January 2015 before the Supreme Court of Nepal, in which she requested the nonapplication of the 35-day statute of limitations for conflict-related individual claims. The Committee notes that according to the author, on 29 May 2019, the Supreme Court dismissed the writ of mandamus, on the ground that the refusal of the police to register the first information report was justified in light of the author’s failure to file it within the 35-day statute of limitations period. The Committee notes the author’s uncontested allegations that she was unable to file a first information report within the legally established 35-day period, given that during that time, she was in a state of shock and physically very weak, was living in a rural area, where most of the inhabitants were illiterate, with no access to legal assistance and no knowledge of the possibility to file a first information report; was unwell and was trying to cope in the aftermath of the attack; and was precluded from seeking support in her indigenous community on account of the strong social stigma attached to victims of sexual violence and the fear she felt, namely of reprisals. Referring to its prior relevant jurisprudence, 19 the Committee considers that the remedies in the criminal justice system were both ineffective and unavailable to the author, in view of the legal and practical limitations on filing a complaint for rape in the State party. 6.5 With regard to the transitional justice system, the Committee notes the author’s argument that not only transitional justice mechanisms are not fully operational, but the registration of her case before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission would not be an effective remedy, (including) because of the Commission’s non-judicial nature, and because of the ruling of the Supreme Court stating that complaints that are pending before the judicial courts may not be referred to the Commission. The Committee recalls its jurisprudence that it is not necessary to exhaust avenues before non-judicial bodies to fulfil the requirements of article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol,20 and that transitional justice mechanisms cannot serve to dispense with the obligation to prosecute the perpetrators of serious human rights violations.21 The Committee therefore considers that resorting to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission would not constitute an effective remedy for the author. 6.6 With respect to the author’s claim under article 7, read in conjunction with article 2 (2) of the Covenant, the Committee recalls that according to its jurisprudence, the provisions of article 2 of the Covenant lay down a general obligation for States parties and do not give rise, when invoked separately, to a claim in a communication under the Optional Protocol. 22 Furthermore, article 2 of the Covenant may not be invoked in a claim in a communication under the Optional Protocol in conjunction with other provisions of the Covenant, except when the failure by the State party to observe its obligations under article 2 is the proximate cause of a distinct violation of the Covenant directly affecting the individual claiming to be a victim.23 In the present case, the Committee observes that the author’s claim under article 7, read in conjunction with article 2 (2) of the Covenant lies in the alleged failure of the State party’s legislation to give effect to her rights in relation to acts of sexual violence. The Committee notes, however, that the author has already alleged a violation of her rights under article 7, resulting from the interpretation and application of the existing laws of the State party. The Committee considers that an examination of whether the State party violated its general obligations under article 2 (2) of the Covenant, read in conjunction with article 7, 19 20 21 22 23 See, for example, Nyaya v. Nepal (CCPR/C/125/D/2556/2015), para. 6.4. See, for example, Katwal v. Nepal (CCPR/C/113/D/2000/2010), para. 6.3. See, for example, Nyaya v. Nepal (CCPR/C/125/D/2556/2015), para. 6.5. See, for example, Griffiths v. Australia (CCPR/C/112/D/1973/2010), para. 6.4. See Timoshenko et al. v. Belarus (CCPR/C/129/D/2461/2014), para. 6.4; Lumbala Tshidika v. Democratic Republic of the Congo (CCPR/C/115/D/2214/2012), para. 5.5; Alger v. Australia (CCPR/C/120/D/2237/2013), para. 6.8; Poliakov v. Belarus (CCPR/C/111/D/2030/2011), para. 7.4; Formonov v. Uzbekistan (CCPR/C/122/D/2577/2015), para. 8.5; compare with Poplavny v. Belarus (CCPR/C/115/D/2019/2010), para. 7.4. 9