CAT/C/54/D/490/2012 not mean that a person might not be subjected to torture in his or her specific circumstances. 9.4 The Committee recalls its general comment No. 1 (1997), in which it is stated that the risk of torture must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory or suspicion. However, the risk does not have to meet the test of being highly probable (para. 6), but it must be personal and present. In this regard, in previous decisions, the Committee has determined that the risk of torture must be foreseeable, real and personal. The Committee recalls that, under the terms of general comment No. 1, it gives considerable weight to findings of fact that are made by organs of the State party concerned, while at the same time, it is not bound by such findings and instead has the power, provided by article 22 (4) of the Convention, to carry out a free assessment of the facts based upon the full set of circumstances in every case. The Committee further recalls that under general comment No. 1 (para. 5), the burden to present an arguable case is on the author of a communication. 9.5 The Committee notes the complainant’s claim that she was arrested by FARDC soldiers while holding a seminar for women in Dongo in 2009 and that she was mistreated and tortured, including by being raped repeatedly, by the soldiers. The Committee notes the submission of the State party that the State authorities have received only one medical report, dated 2 June 2010, which they did not consider sufficient proof of torture. The Committee, however, notes that the report establishes that the scars on the complainant’s body and the psychiatric symptoms exhibited by her are consistent with the complainant’s account of torture. The Committee concludes that the complainant has provided sufficient evidence that she had been subjected to torture in the past. 9.6 The Committee also notes that the complainant alleges that she was subjected to rape and other torture by members of FARDC, who are the official military forces of the State party and are present and active in its entire territory, and that she claims to have escaped from detention by FARDC. The Committee notes the State party’s submission regarding the credibility of the complainant’s account of her political activities and membership of an opposition party and regarding the circumstances of her escape and flight from the country. The Committee, however, recalls that complete accuracy is seldom to be expected from victims of torture and that the inconsistencies in the complainant’s presentation of the facts do not raise doubts about the general veracity of her claims, especially since it has been demonstrated that she suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder.9 The Committee also notes that the complainant was arrested while dressed as a supporter of an opposition party and in possession of a membership card, and observes that that was sufficient to create the perception that she was a member and activist of that party. 9.7 The Committee notes the complainant’s argument that violence against women in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is widespread. In this regard, the Committee recalls its previous jurisprudence and its views in the case of Njamba and Balikosa v. Sweden,10 in which the Committee was not able to identify any particular area in the Democratic Republic of the Congo that could be considered safe for the complainants. The Committee observes that in recent credible reports, namely the 2013 report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the human rights situation and the activities of her Office in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (A/HRC/24/33) and the concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women on the combined sixth and seventh periodic reports of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (CEDAW/C/COD/CO/6-7), it is stated that the widespread violence against women, including rape by national armed groups, security and defence forces, is mostly inherent in 9 10 See also Tala v. Sweden (note 8 above), para. 10.3. Communication No. 322/2007, decision adopted on 14 May 2014, para. 9.5. 9