CAT/C/34/D/233/2003** Page 7 was with the official visits and there was opportunity for him to share sensitive information, especially when bidding his mother farewell. In the course of these visits, supervision lessened, with persons entering and leaving the room. Counsel argues it would not be in the parents’ or the complainant’s interests for them to have overrepresented the situation, as this would needlessly put him at risk of prejudicial treatment as well as distress the complainant’s family still in Sweden. In addition, the parents, elderly persons without political motivation, would thereby be placing themselves at risk of reprisal. 3.5 Furthermore, the complainant’s Egyptian lawyer is well qualified to reach his conclusion, after meeting with the complainant, that he had been tortured. Mr. Hammarberg, for his part, considers this testimony reliable. In advice dated 28 January 2003 provided by Mr. Hammarberg to counsel, the former considered that there was prima facie evidence of torture. He was also of the view that there were deficiencies in the monitoring arrangements implemented by the Swedish authorities, given that during the first weeks after return there were no meetings, while subsequent meeting were neither in private nor with medical examinations undertaken. 3.6 For counsel, the only independent evidence on the question, that of the radio correspondent’s visit, confirms the above conclusions, as the complainant declined to answer a direct question as to whether he had been tortured. He would not have done this had he not feared further reprisals. The complainant also informed the Swedish Ambassador directly on 5 March 2003 that he had been subjected to torture, having by that point allegedly given up any hope that the situation would change. 3.7 Counsel concludes that the complaina nt’s ability to prove torture has been very limited, though he has done his best to inform on his experiences in prison. He has been unable to present a full statement of his experiences or corroborative evidence such as medical reports. The State party’s submissions on the admissibility and merits of the complaint 4.1 By submission of 5 December 2003, the State party contests both the admissibility and the merits of the complaint. It regards complaint as inadmissible (i) for the time elapsed since the exhaustion of domestic remedies, (ii) as an abuse of process, and (iii) as manifestly illfounded. 4.2 While accepting that neither the Convention not the Committee’s case law prescribe a definitive timeframe within which a complaint must be submitted, the State party submits that in light of the content of Rule 107(f) of the Committee’s rules of procedure, this cannot mean that a complaint could never be time-barred. The State party refers to the six month limit applicable to cases submitted to the European Court of Human Rights, including with respect to expulsion cases arising under article 3 of the European Convention, and the strong rationale of legal certainty for both complainants and States underlying that rule. The State party argues that this principle of legal certainty must be considered as one of the fundamental principles inherent in the international legal order. As the Convention as well as the European Convention are both important parts of international human rights law, it would be natural for one regime to seek guidance from another on an issue on which the former is silent. In view