CCPR/C/126/D/2773/2016 5.4 The author asserts that only in 2015 was he able to denounce and seek compensation for the forced labour to which he was subjected. He was subjected to forced labour and physical and psychological abuse until July 2012, when he escaped and returned to his village. In August 2012, he was arbitrarily deprived of his liberty and, by the time he was released, the unduly restrictive one-year deadline to file a complaint, established pursuant to the Child Labour Act, had already passed, leaving him without an effective remedy. The author reiterates that, considering the extreme gravity of crimes such as child and forced labour, a one-year statute of limitations for the submission of claims renders that remedy, per se, ineffective. The author adds that he lived for many years in fear, indigence and without the possibility of acquiring qualified and free legal assistance, until the nongovernmental organization TRIAL International learned of his case and agreed to cover the legal expenses of his case before the domestic authorities. 5.5 The author notes that, in its observations, the State party neglects to account for the fact that, before he attempted to file the complaint before the Labour Office whose registration was rejected, on 27 August 2015, he first attempted to register a first information report before the police, in order to trigger an investigation into his case and the prosecution of those responsible for subjecting him to child and forced labour. The police refused to register the author’s first information report and, on the same day, he lodged a complaint before the Office of the Chief District Officer for his first information report to be registered. The Office also refused to register his complaint. Moreover, the author recalls that, in September 2017, he attempted to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, but it did not offer any effective remedy either. 5.6 Regarding the State party’s allegation that the author submitted his complaint for compensation for the torture suffered after the 35-day statute of limitations had expired, the author recalls that the Committee has held that that particular statute of limitations is in itself inconsistent with the gravity of the crime 17 and requests that the Committee apply its well-established jurisprudence in the present case. 5.7 The author notes that the State party does not dispute in any way that, after all his attempts to trigger the investigation and prosecution of those responsible for his torture, none of the Nepalese authorities concerned ever launched an investigation into his torture allegations. 5.8 The author takes note that the State party considers the fact that the Supreme Court refused to register his cases “unbelievable”, and he is deeply disturbed by the fact that Nepal also suggests that his allegations are “false”. The author recalls that he provided copies of the writ petitions as supporting documentation to the present communication, in addition to the identities of the Supreme Court officers who refused the registration. Instead of only insinuating that his allegations are false, Nepal should provide solid evidence to rebut the allegations, explain why the officers refused to register his complaints and, if appropriate, open an investigation in that regard. The author argues that it is incumbent upon the State party to offer an effective remedy and, in his case, the submission of a writ petition before the Supreme Court proved impossible and therefore an ineffective remedy. Regarding the State party’s claim that he could have appealed to the Supreme Court bench against the order of the Registrar, referring to rule 27 (3) of the Supreme Court Regulations, the author notes that: (a) that rule establishes that the Registrar should provide a written rationale for not registering the writ petitions and makes no reference to the possibility to submit an appeal; and (b) despite his requests, he could never obtain in writing the reasons for the non-registration of the writ petitions. Therefore, it is difficult to see how he could have bypassed the verbal refusals of the Registrar and the Joint-Secretary of the Supreme Court in order to have his case heard; he was therefore left without any effective remedy. 5.9 Regarding the merits of the communication, the author notes that the State party claims that his allegations are not based on facts or reality. However, the author argues that 17 The author refers to the Views of the Committee in Maharajan v. Nepal (CCPR/C/105/D/1863/2009), para. 7.6, and Giri v. Nepal (CCPR/C/101/D/1761/2008 and Corr.1), para. 6.3, and to the Committee’s general comment No. 31 (2004) on the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States parties to the Covenant, para. 18. 9