CCPR/C/132/D/2900/2016 Advance unedited version secure care facility adequate to his disabilities. The Committee notes the author’s position in this respect that prison environment is inappropriate for the rehabilitation and care of nonconvicted individuals who suffer from mental impairment. Furthermore, the Committee is mindful of the author’s statement that owing to the indefinite length of his custodial supervision and the lack of mandatory reviews at regular intervals, his deprivation of liberty had become disproportionate. The Committee observes that the State party contests the arbitrariness of the author’s detention because it had been based on objective and reasonable grounds. In addition, the State party noted that the Supreme Court reviewed the author’s case regularly, a behavioural support plan was also drawn up and less stringent measures were applied whenever his situation allowed for it. 8.3 The Committee recalls its jurisprudence indicating that an arrest or detention may be authorized by domestic law and nonetheless be arbitrary. The notion of “arbitrariness” is not to be equated with “against the law”, but must be interpreted more broadly to include elements of inappropriateness, injustice, lack of predictability and due process of law, as well as elements of reasonableness, necessity and proportionality. 24 In the present case, the Committee notes that the author’s custodial supervision appears to be similar in nature to a sentence of security/preventive detention (indefinite detention until release by the Parole Board)25 and finds the principles established in its jurisprudence 26 and general comment no. 35 (para. 12) concerning the latter relevant for the purposes of examination of the present case. In this regard, the Committee recalls that when a State imposes security detention (sometimes known as administrative detention or internment) not in contemplation of prosecution on a criminal charge, the Committee considers that such detention presents severe risks of arbitrary deprivation of liberty. A present, direct and imperative threat should be invoked to justify the detention of persons considered to present such a threat. The burden of proof lies on States parties to show that the individual poses such a threat, that it cannot be addressed by alternative measures, and that burden increases with the length of the detention. States parties also need to show that detention does not last longer than absolutely necessary, that the overall length of possible detention is limited and that they fully respect the guarantees provided for by article 9 in all cases. Prompt and regular review by a court or other tribunal possessing the same attributes of independence and impartiality as the judiciary is a necessary guarantee for those conditions. 8.4 In the present case, the Committee observes that the initial period of the author’s deprivation of liberty at Alice Springs Correctional Centre was based on the decision of the Supreme Court dated 15 October 1996 pursuant to the then effective s 382 of the NT Criminal Code. This was followed by the decision of the Administrator dated 27 September 2001 ordering that the author be confined in the same facility. Part IIA of the NT Criminal Code came into operation on 15 June 2002 and pursuant to the transitional provisions of s 6 of the Amending Act, the author was taken to be a supervised person held in custody on the same terms and conditions under a custodial order within the meaning of Part IIA. At this juncture, the Committee notes that there is no reason for it to doubt the domestic authorities’ assessment that the author suffered from mental impairment and that due to his condition, his case fell within the scope of the above-mentioned specific laws. 8.5 However, the Committee notes that with the entry into force of the Amending Law, no formal order had been made about the author’s custodial supervision. Although in August 2003 the Supreme Court conducted a review pursuant to s 6(3) and 43 ZH of the Amending Act and a judgment was delivered on 10 September 2003, this had happened with a 6-month delay. Furthermore, contrary to s 43 ZG of the amending Act, no term had been fixed for the supervision order, which was supposed to be followed by a mandatory review towards the end of that period. 27 Although the Supreme Court found in 2007 that despite these 24 25 26 27 12 See e.g. Gorji-Dinka v. Cameroon (CCPR/C/83/D/1134/2002), para. 5.1; Sergei Sotnik v. the Russian Federation (CCPR/C/129/D/2478/2014), para 7.3. See e.g. Allan Kendrick Dean v. New Zealand (CCPR/C/95/D/1512/2006), para. 1. Allan Kendrick Dean v. New Zealand (CCPR/C/95/D/1512/2006), para. 7.4.; Miller et al v. New Zealand (CCPR/C/119/D/2502/2014), para. 8.5. The Supreme Court, later examining whether this has been a mistake, in its 2007 decision noted that the 2003 decision was not a supervision order within the meaning of s 43ZA(1) and therefore no mandatory review had to take place after the expiry of the term of the supervision order. The Supreme