CCPR/C/125/D/3041/2017 admissibility of the communication on the grounds that the author has failed to sufficiently substantiate her claims under article 9. The Committee recalls that article 2 of the Covenant requires that States parties respect and ensure the rights recognized in the Covenant for all persons in their territory and all persons under their jurisdiction. This entails, inter alia, an obligation not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove a person from their territory where there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm, such as that contemplated by articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant, in the country to which removal is to be effected, or in any country to which the person may subsequently be removed. In that connection, the Committee notes that the author did not provide sufficient information regarding her claim under article 9 of the Covenant that would allow the Committee to conclude that her allegations regarding deprivation of liberty would amount to irreparable harm such as that contemplated in articles 6 and 7. Accordingly, the Committee considers that the author has failed to substantiate, for the purposes of admissibility, her allegations that her removal to Angola by the State party would violate article 9, and declares that part of the communication inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol.7 6.6 Concerning the author’s claim under article 13, the Committee notes the State party’s argument that the author’s claims are insufficiently substantiated since the author was interviewed a number of times prior to her pre-removal risk assessment application. The Committee observes that the author’s assessment was examined and that the officer responsible found that there was no risk for the author upon removal, and therefore no need to proceed to an oral hearing. It also notes that that decision was reviewed by the Federal Court, which rejected the author’s request for leave to apply for judicial review on 1 August 2017. In view thereof, the Committee considers that the author has failed to sufficiently substantiate for purposes of admissibility that the above-mentioned proceedings amounted to a denial of justice in her case, in violation of article 13 of the Covenant. The Committee therefore concludes that this part of the communication is inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol. 6.7 The Committee also notes the State party’s argument that the other author’s claims are inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol due to insufficient substantiation. With regard to the author’s allegations under articles 6 (1) and 7 of the Covenant, the Committee observes that the author has explained that she feared returning to Angola because she feared persecution there and being extradited to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where she and her husband would be once again persecuted by security forces, as in the past. With regard to articles 17 (1), 23 and 24 (1) of the Covenant, the Committee observes that the author has explained that the deportation of part of the family is interference in their family life since all members of the family have very strong ties. The Committee considers that, for the purposes of admissibility, the author has sufficiently substantiated her allegations.8 The Committee therefore declares the communication admissible insofar as it raises issues under articles 6 (1), 7, 17 (1), 23 and 24 (1), and proceeds to consideration of the merits. Consideration of the merits 7.1 The Committee has considered the communication in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties, as provided for under article 5 (1) of the Optional Protocol. 7.2 The Committee notes the author’s claim that her expulsion to Angola would put her at risk of being persecuted and extradited to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where she could be subjected to ill-treatment. She further claims that the State party has not reasonably assessed the risk inherent in her removal. 7.3 The Committee recalls paragraph 12 of its general comment No. 31 (2004) on the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States parties to the Covenant, in which it 7 8 10 See S.Z. v. Denmark (CCPR/C/117/D/2443/2014), para. 8.4 and S. v. Denmark (CCPR/C/122/D/2642/2015), para. 7.5. See Biao Lin v. Australia (CCPR/C/107/D/1957/2010), para. 8.6.