or institutional constraints. Methodological recommendations 22.In order to assist and advise the NPM in its task of protecting persons deprived of their liberty, the Subcommittee is making the following recommendations concerning preparations for visits to places of detention, the methods to be used during such visits and steps to be taken following their completion. 23.Prior to the visits . The NPM, as a collegial body of experts, should agree upon and establish a long-term strategy of its activities as well as a subsequent annual plan of work, which would include unannounced and follow-up visits, eventually to all places of detention under the State’s jurisdiction where persons are or may be deprived of liberty, in accordance with articles 4 and 29 of the Optional Protocol. The Subcommittee recommends that the NPM develop collectively criteria for selecting the facilities to be visited that will ensure that they are all visited periodically. These criteria should be based on the type and size of the institutions and the severity of the human rights issues of which the mechanism is aware, while not excluding any type of institution or any geographic area from the scope of its work. 24.The national preventive mechanism should plan its work and its use of resources in such a way as to ensure that it is able to conduct its visits to places of detention in the most efficient manner . The Subcommittee recommends that the national preventive mechanism divide up collectively the tasks to be completed by its members before their arrival at a place of detention, in order to avoid any duplication of work and to enable them to cover as many areas as possible. It also recommends that they choose specific issues to be addressed with particular attention during each visit. 25.While welcoming with satisfaction the information provided that all NPM visits are unannounced, the Subcommittee would like to emphasize the confidential nature of the NPM work, as envisaged in the Optional Protocol. Furthermore, common guidelines for interviews and shared methodology for visits to different places of detention are key to the NPM’s efficiency. In this connection, the Subcommittee welcomes methodology developed by the staff from the Center for Human Rights. At the same time, it observed someinconsistent practices among the team members during the visits. The Subcommittee recommends that, in the medium term, the NPM make available operational guidelines and handbooks to all members and staff of the NPM , with a view to ensuring consistency of working methods and transferal of knowledge among all members of the NPM. 26.During the visits. The Subcommittee observed that members of the NPM have made a good introduction of themselves to the authorities in places of detention, but that the presentation to detainees was extremely brief and did not highlight the key principles of confidentiality and voluntary nature of the interview. The Subcommittee believes that an appropriate and complete presentation would facilitate communication and trust-building with the respondents. The S ubcommittee recommends that members of NPM in charge of the interview introduce themselves to persons deprived of liberty and tell them their name, profession and the position they occupy within the NPM . The interviewer should explain the mandate of the NPM , placing particular emphasis on its preventive nature. The interviewer should also obtain the consent of the interviewee and make it clear that the interview is confidential, voluntary and can be interrupted at any time at the interviewee’s request. The Subcommittee also recommends that the NPM prepare a leaflet that describes its mandate and working methods, explains the concept of informed consent and provides contact information. It should also indicate and encourage persons deprived of liberty to report any reprisal to the NPM using the contact details of the leaflet. 27.Private interviews with persons deprived of their liberty are a basic aspect of the preventive visits, as specifically stated in the Optional Protocol. The Subcommittee has noticed that the majority of interviews conducted during the visits were collective ones and often were done under the surveillance of the wards. Therefore and unless there are compelling reasons to advise against it, the Subcommittee recommends to conduct private individual and unsupervised interviews with detainees and employees of the host institution, including with the medical personnel. 28.The Subcommittee noted that on one occasion some members of NPM focused on individual complaints of detainees and attempted to resolve them. Although the intention is laudable, the Subcommittee recalls that the mandate of the NPM differs from other bodies working against torture and is characterized by its preventive approach through identifying patterns and detecting systemic risks of torture. Instead the NPM should be in a position to advise detainees on how and to whom to address individual complaints. 29.The Subcommittee observed that the visiting teams were lacking equipment, such as torch lamps, measuring tools (for humidity and space measures), etc. In addition, not all the members of the team were wearing badges, which are important for the purpose of identification. The Subcommittee recommends that the NPM use the measuring equipment and wear identification visibly. 30.Follow-up to visits. The Subcommittee wishes to highlight the need for better protection of interviewed persons against eventual reprisals. The Subcommittee has noticed that visiting teams have not mentioned to the authorities of the institutions at the final meeting that any form of intimidation or reprisals against persons deprived of their liberty constitutes a violation of the State party’s obligation. It is particularly alarming taking into account the prevalence of collective interviews versus individual ones and the presence of the staff of the institutions during these interviews. The S ubcommittee recommends the NPM to strengthen protection of persons who provide information to the Subcommittee against sanctions or reprisals through , inter alia, follow-up visits, and contacts with family members , and strong warning to the authorities of detention facilities that such behaviour will be reported and sanctioned. 31.The NPM should prepare and make public the reports on the visits it conducts. Its visits will be much less effective if it does not issue a report following each visit. The Subcommittee recommends that a report should be an output for every