Colonel Sh. Mamyrov, the special representative of the MoI under the MoU, who serves as a link between the leadership of the MoI and Memorandum partners. Surprisingly, monitoring groups found it harder to access pretrial detention facilities under the SSEP. In total, within the framework of this project as many as 17 monitoring visits to pre-trial detention facilities were carried out. All these visits, except for one visit, were conducted with prior notification to the relevant authorities. An observer communicating with an officer of the Panfilov DDI In two cases, the leadership of the SSEP officially prohibited conducting monitoring visits due to operational and security circumstances in the penal system during the time periods mentioned in letters of request.18 Before every monitoring visit, the monitoring group explained the purpose of the visit to officers on duty in PDFs. As it turned out, in seven cases they were informed about the participation of the SSEP in the MoU and the obligation to facilitate the conduct of monitoring visits, whereas in ten cases they were not informed. During eight visits, observers faced obstacles in gaining access to pre-trial detention facilities. There was one case when access was denied because of a lunch break. It was only after the duty officer provided the chief of the facility with written approval from the SSEP that observers were allowed to carry out a monitoring visit, but only after the lunch break. A monitoring group with staff members of the Toguz-Toro DDI In five cases, relevant heads of PDFs were not at their workplace at the time of arrival of the monitors (in three cases – head of PDF No. 23,19 in one case – head of the pre-trial detention facility under educational colony No. 1420 and in one case – head of PDF No. 2421) which meant that the “required” permission, as stated by the duty officer, could not be given with the result of hindering the timely beginning of the monitoring visits. Monitoring teams failed to carry out monitoring visits to PDF No. 14, 21 and 50, all located in Chuy province. Heads of these facilities denied access to the observers, despite written permissions from the leadership of the SSEP, asserting that there were only arrested individuals under investigation in the institutions at the moment, and official permission to communicate with them was required from investigation and judicial bodies under the applicable legislation. In another case the chief of PDF No. 23 flatly refused to let the monitoring group in until he officially receives a copy of the MoU from the SSEP. However, when the official permission from the SSEP was finally provided, the head of PDF No. 23 did not let the monitoring group in anyway and refused to meet with the observers. 18 Letters from the SSEP of 23 August 2012 (Ref. No. 100/02-2748) and of 31 October 2012 (Ref. No. 100/02-3440) Monitoring group report, Ref. No. S/D-11, S/D-12, S/D-15. 20 Monitoring group report, Ref. No. S/D-1. 21 Monitoring group report, Ref. No. S/D-17. 19 28