CCPR/C/123/D/2767/2016 10.3 The Committee further notes that the treatment to which the author was subjected had a discriminatory purpose based on her sex, in the light of the nature of the sexual comments made and of the sexualized treatment and gender-based violence inflicted on her. The Committee also takes note of the pattern of sexual violence against women detained in the State party and the prevailing impunity for such violations. 21 Consequently, the Committee considers that the treatment to which the author was subjected also constitutes a violation of article 3, read in conjunction with article 7 of the Covenant. 10.4 Having concluded that there has been a violation of articles 7 and 3, read in conjunction with article 7, the Committee does not consider it necessary to examine the author’s complaint under article 10 of the Covenant separately in respect of the same facts. 10.5 The Committee takes note of the author’s allegations that her detention on charges of defamation and calumny for her publication was a violation of her right to freedom of expression under article 19 of the Covenant. The Committee recalls that “freedom of opinion and freedom of expression are ... essential for any society. They constitute the foundation stone for every free and democratic society.”22 The Committee further recalls that “when a State party imposes restrictions on the exercise of freedom of expression, these may not put in jeopardy the right itself” and that “the relation between right and restriction and between norm and exception must not be reversed”. 23 Furthermore, the restrictions must “be provided by law ... and conform to the strict tests of necessity and proportionality”.24 10.6 In the present case, the Committee takes note of the authors’ allegations, which the State party has not challenged, that, as a result of publishing a book in which she identified senior business leaders and officials involved in the sexual exploitation of children, one of the business leaders mentioned filed a complaint against the author in the State of Puebla for the offences of defamation and calumny, on the basis of the legislation in force in the State at that time, and that the complaint led to the author’s arrest on 16 December 2005 by a group of at least 10 armed men, including private agents of the businessman in question. The Committee also takes note of the author’s allegations that, at the time of her arrest, no arrest warrant was shown and that she was not allowed to contact her lawyer during her transfer, which lasted 20 hours. The State party submits that the author’s detention was in accordance with the legislation in force at that time in the State of Puebla but has provided no further information to justify that the detention was necessary and proportionate. 10.7 The Committee recalls that “States parties should put in place effective measures to protect against attacks aimed at silencing those exercising their right to freedom of expression. Paragraph 3 may never be invoked as a justification for the muzzling of any advocacy of multi-party democracy, democratic tenets and human rights. Nor, under any circumstance, can an attack on a person, because of the exercise of his or her freedom of opinion or expression, including such forms of attack as arbitrary arrest, torture, threats to life and killing, be compatible with article 19. ... All such attacks should be vigorously investigated in a timely fashion, and the perpetrators prosecuted, and the victims ... be in receipt of appropriate forms of redress.”25 10.8 The Committee further recalls that “States parties should consider the decriminalization of defamation and, in any case, the application of the criminal law should only be countenanced in the most serious of cases and imprisonment is never an appropriate penalty”.26 If defamation should never result in a penalty of deprivation of liberty being imposed on the grounds that it is not an appropriate penalty, then a fortiori no detention based on charges of defamation may ever be considered either necessary or proportionate. 10.9 In the context described (see para. 10.6), and even assuming that the author’s detention was based on the state legislation in force in the State of Puebla and that the 21 22 23 24 25 26 12 In this regard, see the Committee’s Views in Purna Maya v. Nepal (CCPR/C/119/D/2245/2013), para. 12.4. General comment No. 34 on freedoms of opinion and expression, para. 2. Ibid., para. 21. Ibid., para. 22. Ibid., para. 23. Ibid., para. 47. GE.18-14178