Kosovo/Kosova As Seen, As Told Kosovo Serb-owned/frequented) and on streets and markets (see Part V, various municipality entries). Open hostilities Following the talks in Rambouillet, France (6-23 February 1999), there was a significant build up of VJ forces throughout Kosovo, leading to the arming of civilians 22 of anti-aircraft weapons, the digging of tank pits 20 21 and the training of reservists, the arrival and the preparation of demolition explosives along 23 key routes in from the south and an increase in military air activity . Sightings of "paramilitary" units (with long beards, or hats with a Serbian badge on front, or using civilian vehicles, or other irregularities) were also reported. 24 Of consequence were the numbers of VJ "exercises". Priority appears initially to have been given to the strategically important route to the west of Vucitrn that links Kosovska Mitrovica to Pristina by both rail and road and runs parallel to the eastern edge of the UCK-dominated Drenica region. The exercises started south of Kosovska Mitrovica and continued into the Bukos/Bukosh area, starting on 25 25 February. Part of Kacanik/Kacanik municipality suffered the violent attentions of the security forces following what was an alleged kidnapping by the UCK of a Kosovo Albanian local politician at the end of February. Tensions rose until full-scale clashes took place resulting in the burning of villages and the displacement of villagers. The operation was completed by 10 March when verifiers were able to visit Kotlina/Kotline where they found the residents still there (too frightened to move elsewhere) as well as a number of IDPs from nearby hamlets. While Kotlina was largely unaffected by the fighting, the nearby hamlet of Drosec had 10 or 12 houses burned and the hamlet of Ivaja/Ivaje had 28 out of 40 houses 26 burned. Three male bodies identified as those of UCK members were also found. Problems arose during the incident when the UCK refused the UNHCR access to IDPs in Kotlina. Although the situation was resolved and an apology issued, there were indications that the UCK was also responsible for creating a number of IDPs and using the villages as front line defences. 27 The UCK was also clearly responsible for unco-operative behaviour and escalating tensions in other areas. OSCE-KVM verifiers from the Rastane/Rashtan field office (west of Suva Reka/Suhareke town) reported that the UCK commander refused to meet the OSCE-KVM unless they had "authorization papers". The verifiers informed the UCK that digging defensive positions overlooking the police checkpoint at Rastane was considered by the police as provocative and would result in police taking 28 action unless the UCK desisted. The UCK also dug positions west of Suva Reka near Mamusa/ Mamushe (Prizren). The commander of the UCK element told the OSCE-KVM that he had been 29 instructed by higher UCK command to build defensive positions. On 11 March, the security forces conducted a joint operation against the UCK in Jeskovo/Jeshkove (south-west of Prizren). The VJ deployed in Hoca Zagradska/Hoce e Qytetit, Bilusa/Billushe and Bijac/ http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/hr/part1/ch3.htm (10 of 16)12/5/2003 11:48:47 AM