CEDAW/C/55/D/33/2011 remove her to a place where she will allegedly suffer discriminatory treatment contrary to the Convention. The decision to return the author to Uganda, however, cannot engage the State party’s responsibility under articles 1, 2 (c), 2 (d) and 3 of the Convention. 4.6 The State party further notes that the concept of jurisdiction for the purposes of article 2 of the Optional Protocol must be considered to reflect the meaning of the term in public international law, i.e. that a State’s jurisdictional competence is primarily territorial. Only in exceptional circumstances can acts of States parties that produce effects in other States amount to responsibility for the acting State party (“extraterritorial effect”). The State party submits that no such exceptional circumstances exist in the current case and that Denmark cannot be held responsible for violations of the Convention that are expected to be committed by another State party outside both the Danish territory and Danish jurisdiction. 4.7 The State party submits that the question of extraterritorial effect has not been directly addressed in any published jurisprudence of the Committee and that there is no jurisprudence to indicate that the relevant provisions of the Convention have any extraterritorial effect. 8 The European Court of Human Rights, however, has clearly stressed in its case law 9 the exceptional character of extraterritorial protection of the rights contained in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights). 4.8 The State party further submits that article 1 of the Optional Protocol to the Covenant stipulates, just as article 2 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention, that the Human Rights Committee can receive communications from individuals subject to the jurisdiction of a State party who claim to be victims of a violation by that State party of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant. The Human Rights Committee has found on a number of occasions that the deportation of persons by States parties to other States that would result in a foreseeable breach of their right to life, as set out in article 6 of the Covenant, or their freedom from torture, as set out in article 7 of the Covenant, would entail a violation. The Human Rights Committee has, however, never considered a complaint on its merits regarding deportation of a person who feared a lesser human rights violation in the receiving State (e.g. violation of a derogable right) by the receiving State. 10 4.9 The State party argues that the guidance that is to be found in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and the Human Rights Committee clearly indicates that, except in wholly exceptional circumstances, aliens who are subject to deportation cannot claim an entitlement to remain in the territory of a State party simply to benefit from the right to non-discrimination that they would enjoy there and that would be denied to them in the receiving State. Accordingly, the returning of a woman who arrives in Denmark simply to escape from discriminatory treatment __________________ 8 9 10 8/19 Reference is made to communication No. 10/2005, N. S. F. v. the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, inadmissibility decision of 30 May 2007. Judgement of the European Court of Human Rights in Soering v. the United Kingdom (application No. 14038/88), 7 July 1989, para. 88. See also the decisions of the Court in F. v. the United Kingdom (application No. 17341/03), 22 June 2004, and Z. and T. v. the United Kingdom (application No. 27034/05), 28 February 2006. See Sarah Joseph, Jenny Schultz and Melissa Castan, eds., The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials and Commentary, 2nd ed. (New York, Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 94. 13-42827