CCPR/C/130/D/3246/2018 July 2018. The Migration Court of Appeal decided not to grant leave to appeal on 14 August 2018. 4.9 The author applied for a residence permit or a re-examination on three more occasions, claiming that information on his sexual orientation had spread on the Internet and had reached people in Afghanistan who had in turn threatened him on social media. He also claimed to be engaged to a man and that this information had been noted in Afghanistan. The Migration Agency rejected his applications on 30 July, 14 August and 29 August 2018, finding that said grounds were modifications of previously invoked circumstances rather than new ones, that nothing indicated that the information concerned had spread to people constituting a real and current threat to him in Afghanistan and that no details had been provided about who these people were or to substantiate that they would search for him in Afghanistan. The Migration Court rejected the author’s appeal against the final decision on 13 September 2018. 4.10 The State party contends that the author has escalated his asylum account before every domestic instance, including at very late stages. As for his alleged conversion, the noninvocation of this ground before the Committee strongly indicates that he has not converted out of a personal and genuine religious conviction. The State party argues that the author’s statements about his sexual orientation and gender identity are similarly doubtful. On the pictures submitted, the State party observes that most images were taken with filters available to anyone with a smartphone and that they are not sufficient to substantiate his claims. The State party concludes that the author’s account is not such as to lead to a conclusion that he would run a foreseeable, real and personal risk of treatment contrary to the Covenant. Author’s comments on the State party’s observations on admissibility and the merits 5.1 On 10 September 2019, the author provided his comments on the State party’s observations. He contests that the communication is manifestly ill-founded, because it contains detailed information and pictures concerning his sexual orientation, gender identity and religion. He reiterates that he has been wrongly deprived of a new examination and interview in relation to these grounds. The scope of the initial submission was limited to his sexual orientation and gender identity, but the information submitted to the domestic authorities on his conversion still stands. He submits a certificate indicating membership in the Vallersvik Church and that he is an active member. On the timing of the invocation of his sexual orientation, he states that, in conformity with the practice of the Swedish border police, he was not notified of when he would be removed. 5.2 The author notes that, in F.G. v. Sweden, the European Court of Human Rights found that States were obliged to carry out a risk assessment of their own motion if they were “made aware of facts relating to a specific individual that could expose him [or her] to a risk of illtreatment in breach of [the right to life and the prohibition of torture] upon returning to the country in question” and that this applied in particular to situations “where the national authorities have been made aware of the fact that the asylum seeker may plausibly be a member of a group systemically exposed to practice of ill-treatment and there are serious reasons to believe in the existence of the practice in question and in his or her membership of the group concerned.”9 The author argues, therefore, that the domestic authorities must assess the risk of persecution when new facts arise and that such facts cannot be rejected simply because they are invoked late. Furthermore, no single document can prove a person’s genuine identification as a lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender person, or as Christian, and therefore the author can only substantiate his claims through an interview. Moreover, Swedish legislation concerning new examinations sets a very low standard of proof for granting a new examination, requiring only that “it could be assumed” from the claim that the asylum seeker needs protection. The author argues that the information submitted to the domestic authorities is more than enough to meet this standard and that the domestic authorities have therefore not conducted an adequate investigation. 5.3 The author reiterates that individuals who have converted to Christianity and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons in Afghanistan are extremely vulnerable and 9 European Court of Human Rights, F.G. v. Sweden, Application No. 43611/11, Judgment, 23 March 206, para. 127. 5