Doubt in Favour of the Defendant, Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt For instance, in Germany the judge’s conviction of the defendant’s guilt “must be subjective and must be based on persuasive factors, which leave no room for reasonable doubt.”287 In Italy, when referring to convicting judgment the LCP states that: “The judge shall convict the defendant only if the defendant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime he is charged with”.288 In the LCP of Serbia, accused individuals may not be convicted unless the prosecution proves their guilt with certainty.289 The domestic LCP, when referring to acquitting decision, states that the court shall acquit whenever the prosecution fails to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty.290 An interesting proposition about how the judges/jurors should use the maxim beyond reasonable doubt in order to minimize the possibility of mistakes has been made by the distinguished philosopher of science Larry Laudan, the objective of which is to not only reduce the number of false convictions, but also the number of false acquittals. He claims that there should be just one simple rule that the jurors should use in the context of the required standard of proof, and that rule being: “Figure out whether the facts established by the prosecution rule out every reasonable hypothesis you can think of that would leave the defendant innocent. If they do, convict; otherwise, acquit”.291 Two meanings of the burden of proof in the common law systems Going back to the burden of proof of guilt, in common law systems, the term “burden of proof” can have two different meanings. Distinguishing between these two meanings is important and necessary due to the distribution of functions between the judge and the jury. Generally, the trial judge decides questions of law, whereas the jury decides questions of fact. This explains why juries are referred to as the fact-finder (also known jury trial, known as a bench trial.292It is within this division of labor between the judge (as the law-giver) and the jury (as the fact-finder) that the judge throughout the trial proceedings will instruct the jury on its obligations and the various rights afforded to the accused as stated above. 287 Richard S. Frase & Thomas Weigend, German Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law Reform: Similar Problems, Better Solutions?, 18(2) B. C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 317, 343-44 (1995) (hereinafter “Frase & Weigend”), p. 344. See generally Section III, Reasonable Doubt Standard in Other Jurisdictions. 288 LCP of Italy, Article 533 (1). 289 LCP of Serbia, Article 18. 290 Domestic LCP, Article 403 (3). 291 Youngjae Lee, Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, Volume 105, Reasonable Doubt and Moral Elements, 2015, p. 14 footnote 49, referring to LARRY LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW 82 (2006). 292 Under US law, trial by jury in criminal cases is a constitutional right under the Sixth Amendment to the US Constitution and is usually a matter of course for most criminal cases. However, under certain circumstances, there is a possibility for a bench trial (trial by judge). Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: “If the defendant is entitled to a jury trial, the trial must be by jury unless: (1) the defendant waives a jury trial in writing; (2) the government consents; and (3) the court approves.” In a criminal case tried without a jury, the judge plays the role of the jury as trier of fact. 66