Doubt in Favour of the Defendant, Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of his guilt, which implies, that where there is doubt, the consequence should be acquittal of the party on trial.”382 The Court acknowledged that although Macnally’s statement was “well calculated to mislead Juries,” it agreed with his interpretation of the standard.383 The Court referred to Macnally’s reminder that jurors have the duty “before they pronounce a verdict of condemnation, to ask themselves whether they are satisfied, beyond the probability of doubt, that he is guilty of the charge alleged against him in the indictment.”384 The Court noted Justice Chamberlain’s jury charge in The King v. Patrick Finny that “if there be a doubt, I take it to be a clear maxim, founded in humanity as well as law, that you must acquit the prisoner.”385 The Court also noted with approval the work of Starkie, stating that “absolute, mathematical or metaphysical certainty is not essential; and besides, in judiciary investigations, it is wholly unattainable. Moral certainty is all that can be required.”386 Starkie stated that “to acquit upon light, trivial and fanciful suppositions, and remote conjectures, is a virtual violation of the juror’s oath[;]” however, “a juror ought not to condemn unless the evidence exclude[s] from his mind all reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, and … unless he be so convinced by the evidence that he would venture to act upon that conviction in matters of the highest concern and importance to his own interest.”387 The Court agreed that the treatises fairly reflected the language used in the jury instruction given by the trial judge.388 The Court stressed that guilt need not “always be established by demonstrative and irrefragable evidence. It is enough that the evidence, whatever its character, whether positive or presumptive, direct or circumstantial, satisfies the understanding and conscience of the Jury.”389 The Court used multiple terms to describe the standard of proof in criminal cases: “reasonable doubt,” “moral certainty,” and “satisfied conscience.” As discussed in the previous subsections, these are vague and loaded terms, which convey different meanings and add to the confusion. It does not appear that the Court used these terms to communicate distinct standards, but rather as synonyms in an attempt to clarify the reasonable doubt standard, whether successfully or not. The Court’s interchangeable use of these terms demonstrates a substantial lack of clarity in the definition of reasonable doubt. Giles, at 285, citing Macnally, p. 2. Giles, at 284. 384 Giles, at 285, citing Macnally, p. 3 (emphasis added). 385 Giles, at 285, citing Macnally, p. 5, citing The King v. Patrick Finny, at a Commission of Oyer and Terminer, Dublin, January 1798, 38 Geo. III, Ridgeway’s Rep. 147. 386 Giles, at 285 (emphasis added), citing Starkie, p. 514. 387 Starkie, p. 514. 388 Giles, at 285. 389 Giles, at 286 (italics in original). 382 383 94