Doubt in Favour of the Defendant, Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt Regarding Sandoval’s claim, Justice O’Connor noted that the instruction given to the jury, in that case, was based on Chief Justice Shaw’s instruction from Webster.474 She noted with approval that the Webster definition was “probably the most satisfactory definition given to the words ‘reasonable doubt’ in any case known to criminal jurisprudence.”475 Sandoval’s main objection was to the use of the terms “moral evidence” and “moral certainty” used by the trial judge in the jury instruction.476 Justice O’Connor stated that “when Chief Justice Shaw penned the Webster instruction in 1850, moral certainty meant a state of subjective certitude about some event or occurrence.”477 She noted that previous US Supreme Court cases have stated that “proof to a ‘moral certainty’ is an equivalent phrase with ‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’”478 While acknowledging that the term “moral certainty” “might not be recognized by modern jurors as a synonym for ‘proof beyond a reasonable doubt,’” Justice O’Connor found that the use of the term did not make the instruction unconstitutional. Justice O’Connor found that, although “moral certainty is ambiguous in the abstract, the rest of the instruction given in Sandoval’s case lends content to the phrase.”479 Justice O’Connor reasoned that “the moral certainty language cannot be sequestered from its surroundings,” distinguishing its use in Sandoval’s case from Cage, because the context of the instruction meant that “there [was] no reasonable likelihood that the jury would have understood moral certainty to be disassociated from the evidence in the case.”480 Accordingly, the Court rejected Sandoval’s contention that “the moral certainty element … invited the jury to convict him on proof below that required by the Due Process Clause.”481 Victor’s main argument was that “equating a reasonable doubt with a ‘substantial doubt’ overstated the degree of doubt necessary for acquittal.”482 While the Court acknowledged that the “construction is somewhat problematic,”483 Victor was distinguished from Cage, with Justice O’Connor stating “we did not hold that the reference to substantial doubt alone was sufficient to render the instruction unconstitutional.”484 The Court examined the dictionary definition of the word “substantial,” and determined that the context in the present case shows that the word was clearly being used to describe the “existence rather than magnitude of the doubt.”485 With regard to the “hesitate to act” language,486 the Court Victor, at 8, citing Webster, at 320. Victor, at 7. 476 Victor, at 10. 477 Victor, at 12. 478 Victor, at 12, citing Fidelity Mutual Life Association. v. Mettler, 185 U.S. 308, 317 (1902). 479 Victor, at 14. 480 Victor, at 16. 481 Victor, at 15. 482 Victor, at 19. 483 Victor, at 19. 484 Victor, at 19-20 (emphasis added), citing Cage, at 41. 485 Victor, at 20 (emphasis added). 486 Victor, at 18, “...to pause and hesitate before taking the represented facts as true and relying and acting thereon.” 474 475 106