C O M P A R AT I V E S T U D Y cannot possibly be otherwise, without implying a Contradiction; yet may they be so certain as not to admit of any reasonable Doubt concerning them.96 As Steve Sheppard interprets Wilkins’ classification of certainty, “when evidence for a point is less than that which would necessitate every unprejudiced person’s assent, the point was, as he put it, a matter of reasonable doubt.”97 Thus, moral certainty depended upon mixed circumstances and evidence that are so certain that there can be no reasonable doubt about it. Gratian, a canon lawyer from Bologna, in his Decretum, introduced the doctrine of “doubt” into canon criminal law: C.LXXIV. A decision that purports to be certain does not resolve a doubtful matter. It is a serious and unseemly business to go giving certain judgments in doubtful cases. C.LXXV. Things that are not proved through certain evidence are not to be believed. Even though certain things may be true, nevertheless they are not to be believed by the judge, unless they are proved by certain evidence.98 FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF JURY TRIALS AND THE REASONABLE DOUBT STANDARD IN THE ANGLOSAXON WORLD The development and increasing mobility of society modified the character of the jury trial, so the pressure over jury intensified in the XVI and XVII century. The role of the jury was gradually limited to considering sworn evidence in court.99 Jurors were no longer self-informing, but listened to and assessed the evidence advanced by the parties.100 Residential requirements became less important and the selection of jurors was based more on status and administrative experience, rather than geography.101 Wilkins, p. 7. Stephen M. Sheppard, The Metamorphosis of Reasonable Doubt: How Changes in the Burden of Proof Have Weakened the Presumption of Innocence, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1165 (2003) (hereinafter “Sheppard”), p. 1180. 98 Decreti Pars Secunda, C.11, q. 3 c. 74, available at http://geschichte.digitale-sammlungen.de/decretumgratiani/kapitel/dc_chapter_1_1077 (last accessed 14 April 2016), cited and translated in Whitman, p. 118. 99 Baker, p. 75. See also Shapiro, Doubt, p. 5, citing Kevin M. Teeven, Seventeenth-Century Evidentiary Concerns and the Statute of Frauds, 9 Adelaide L. Rev. 225 (1983). 100 Baker, p. 75-76, citing Anonymous Case (1577) Dyer’s circuit notes, 110 SS 410, pl. 37, Graves v. Short (1598) Cro. Eliz. 616. See also Shapiro, Doubt, p. 5-6, 72, citing John M. Mitnick, From Neighbor Witness to Judge of Proofs: The Transformation of the English Civil Juror, 32 Am. J. Legal Hist. 203, 204 (1988); Thomas A. Green, Verdict According to Conscience: Perspectives on the English Criminal Trial Jury, 1200-1800 (University of Chicago Press 1988) (hereinafter “Green”); Guide to English Juries, Setting Forth Their Antiquity, Power, and Duty, from the Common-Law and Statutes. By a Person of Quality, 71, 73, 76 (London 1682). 101 Shapiro, Doubt, p. 5, 52, 71. See also P. G. Lawson, Lawless Juries? The Composition and Behavior of Hertfordshire Juries, 1573-1624, in Twelve Good Men and True 117, 123-24 (Cockburn & Green eds., 1988); Baron John Somers, The Security of Englishmen’s Lives or the Trust, Power, and Duty of the Grand Juries of England, Explained According to the Fundamentals of the English Government, and the Declarations of the Same Made in Parliament by Many Statutes, 82, 119, 122, 145, 147-148, 151 (W. Dyde 1798). 96 97 31