Doubt in Favour of the Defendant, Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt In dubio pro reo is not an evidentiary rule. It only implies that in criminal proceedings the Court shall decide by reaching a verdict in a manner that is more favourable for the accused, only if the court, having thoroughly assessed the individual pieces of evidence and their relevance with other evidence, still has doubts that cannot be resolved regarding the existence or nonexistence of facts that define the crime, or which determine the implementation of certain provisions of criminal legislation, and it does not contain criteria which the Court of first instance would be obliged to consider in the adjudicating process, if certain facts are proven to a certain degree of probability compared with the others.(…)346 The same approach is shared by the Federal Supreme Court of Bosnia and Hercegovina and Supreme Court of Republika Srpska: When even after complete and meticulous evaluation of every piece of evidence and their relevance to other evidence, the court could not exclude the possibility that the deficit which incurred in the business transactions of the company, could have been caused by other reasons other than the accused appropriating the money, the court was right to resolve the doubt about the existence of that adjudicating fact, the defendant’s appropriation of the money she was entrusted with, by deciding in a way that is more favourable for the accused.347 The in dubio pro reo principle does not mean that the existence of contradictory evidence by itself excludes the possibility of reliably determining the relevant facts and that it imposes an obligation on the court to conclude about the existence or nonexistence of such facts in the way which is more favourable for the accused. This principle implies the obligation of the court to conscientiously evaluate every piece of evidence and its relevance with the rest of the evidence, especially an assessment of the credibility of contradictory evidence, and in accordance with such an assessment to conclude whether certain adjudicating facts can be considered proven or not proven. If the court, despite of this, remains in doubt with regard to certain adjudicating facts that define the essential elements of the criminal offense and on which the application of a criminal law depends on, that doubt must be resolved in a manner that is more favourable for the accused.348 Therefore, the in dubio pro reo principle does not present a limitation or derogation from the principle of free evaluation of evidence but, on contrary, it practically emanates from it.349 When the court is convinced of the existence of the decisive facts, based on the unfettered consideration of evidence, the court expresses a belief by rendering a decision resolving Supreme Court of Republic of Croatia, Judgement U-III/80/2010, 06.04.2011. Supreme Court of Federation Bosnia and Hercegovina, Judgment 09 0 K 014393 13 Kž, 14.01.2014. Supreme Court of Federation Bosnia and Hercegovina, Judgement Kž-610/06, 06.02.2006. 349 Škulić, M., op. cit., p. 68. 346 347 348 82