Doubt in Favour of the Defendant, Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt Below can be found an exhaustive elaboration by the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Hercegovina from 2006 and 2014 on the court reasoning and how it may affect the application of the principle of in dubio pro reo: (…) The unfettered consideration of evidence is, hence, freed of the legal rules that would a priori determine the probative value of certain evidence. However, the unfettered consideration of evidence requires that every item of evidence and its relevance with the rest of the evidence be explained, and that they be brought into a logical mutual connection. The principle of unfettered consideration of evidence does not represent an absolute freedom. This freedom is limited by general rules and regulations of human thinking, logic and experience. This is why the court has an obligation to describe in the verdict rationale the process of evaluation of individual evidence, to bring every single evidence in relation with other available evidence and make conclusions as to whether certain facts are proven. (…) In the light of this, the Constitutional court stresses that the Court of first instance evaluated the testimonies of several witnesses as arbitrary, without providing more detail on the basis of which the Court gained that impression, and not explaining the process of evaluation of the evidence as required by the principle of unfettered consideration of evidence. The Constitutional Court holds that such an explanation does not satisfy the requirement of careful and conscientious assessment of evidence since the subjective belief of the court that the appellant committed the criminal offense he is charged with is not sufficient, but there must be real truth in the conclusion of the court, explained and grounded on the objective facts. Regular courts cannot just say that they do not believe a particular witness just because his testimony is in contradiction with the testimony of another witness they trust, nor is it enough to subjectively qualify the evidence as “arbitrary”. (…)Taking this into account, the Constitutional court finds that the lack of satisfactory explanation of the appellant’s guilt, and the lack of objectification of court’s subjective evaluation with a comprehensive analysis and assessment of the presented evidence, does not correspond to the demand of a fair trial prescribed in Article 6 Paragraph 1 of the European convention. The court also considers that the opinions of the challenged judgments do not satisfy the obligation of respecting the in dubio pro reo principle. Based on everything said, the Constitutional Court considers that the opinions of the disputed judgments do not meet the requirements of a fair trial, but give the impression of arbitrariness, so they violated the appellant’s right to a fair trial under Article 6 paragraph 1 of the European Convention.(…) 352 (…) With regard to the appellant’s allegations about the violation of the principle of in dubio pro reo, the Constitutional Court 352 84 Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Hercegovina, Judgment AP 1603/05, 21.12.2006.